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THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN NORTH
CAROLINA*
ALFRED L. BROPHY** & ELIZABETH TROUTMAN***
This Article places North Carolina into the social, political, and
legal context of the movement in the United States that resulted in
the sterilization of more than thirty thousand people from the
1920s through the 1960s. We sketch the social and political
arguments that were mobilized to support sterilization, as well as
the jurisprudence that developed alongside these arguments from
the 1910s through the 1930s.
State courts were initially slow to accept sterilization until the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in 1927 in Buck v. Bell.
Following this decision, courts and legislatures around the
United States more readily accepted these practices, even as legal
scholars expressed reservations about sterilization. For nearly
two decades, until the United States’ entrance into World War II,
sterilization was broadly accepted by courts. But the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1942
began to turn the tide against sterilization, as did unease with a
procedure that was reminiscent of practices touted in Nazi
Germany. Yet, even after Skinner v. Oklahoma and the end of
World War II, as the rest of the nation began to abandon
sterilization, sterilizations continued in North Carolina.
The legal basis for allowing sterilization in North Carolina was
that procedural safeguards could overcome any concerns about
infringement of personal liberty. This same due process,
however, ultimately required the state to develop machinery to
facilitate sterilization. The Eugenics Board of North Carolina,
the state board in charge of reviewing petitions from public
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health officials for sterilization, produced pre-printed forms to
hasten the approval of sterilizations. The Eugenics Board
routinely granted the vast majority of sterilization petitions and
the few sterilization orders that were challenged in court were
regularly upheld. While the number of coerced sterilizations is
unknown, the practice disproportionately impacted lower
income, and later, female and African American, North
Carolinians.
Recent legislation in North Carolina provides modest payments
to the victims of the state’s sterilization program. While payments
for this concentrated episode of state infringement on personal
liberty should be applauded, the group of recipients may be both
under- and over-inclusive, and some victims have problems
proving their entitlement to compensation. Nevertheless, the
North Carolina legislation provides a model for legislative action
in other states. This dark chapter of North Carolina history is
critical to the legal community’s collective conscious, lest we
again allow an administrative apparatus of the state to
overshadow and obliterate our most dearly held freedoms.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1943, Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell
published a lengthy analysis of the constitutionality of compulsory
vaccination and sterilization in the North Carolina Law Review.1
1. See generally Thomas R. Powell, Compulsory Vaccination and Sterilization:
Constitutional Aspects, 21 N.C. L. REV. 253 (1943) (analyzing the constitutionality of
compulsory sterilization and vaccination).
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Powell offered guidance on constitutionally permissible public health
measures from vaccination through sterilization. His article reads very
much like the opinion of a legal realist with several references
describing the ambiguous state of the law and difficulty in predicting
the outcome of subsequent cases. He wrote towards the end of the
article, “[i]f all this seems sadly vague and amorphous to those who
extract certainties out of test tubes, it can only be answered that of
such is the kingdom of jurisprudence.”2
Powell thought that the twin Supreme Court precedents of Buck
v. Bell3 in 1927 and Skinner v. Oklahoma4 in 1942 shined little “light
on what they or their successors would do with milder eugenic
measures, except to make clear that they would be zealous in insisting
upon strong scientific support for the necessity and the efficacy of
prophylactic prescriptions and upon adequate procedural safeguards
in picking the persons subjected to them.”5 Later Powell observed
that Skinner v. Oklahoma, which struck down Oklahoma’s law
permitting sterilization of those convicted of three felonies, would not
be a “stumbling block in the way of any sane public health program
however much it may intrude on privacy and preclude selfdetermination.”6
Powell’s article was published while North Carolina was in the
midst of a decades-long program of sterilization. Several years later,
Duke Law Professor James Bradway—a famous figure in the
development of legal aid and clinical education7—published a brief
article that summarized North Carolina’s law regarding involuntary
and voluntary sterilization.8 He included the good news for physicians
that they were immune from civil liability for participation in what
Bradway termed “involuntary sterilizations” ordered by the Eugenics
Board of North Carolina (“Eugenics Board”), “except in the case of

2.
3.

Id. at 264.
274 U.S. 200 (1927). See generally ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME
COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2016)
(documenting the story of Carrie Buck and the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell).
4. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
5. Powell, supra note 1, at 263.
6. Id. at 264.
7. See Guide to the John S. Bradway Papers, 1914–1949, DUKE U. LIBR. (Apr. 2014),
http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingaids/uabradjs/ [https://perma.cc/85ZN-RU3G]
(discussing Bradway’s importance to legal education).
8. See generally John S. Bradway, The Legality of Human Sterilization in North
Carolina, 11 N.C. MED. J. 250 (1950) (discussing the North Carolina law regarding
sterilization procedures).
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negligence in the performance of said operation.”9 Both Powell and
Bradway lent strong academic support to the eugenics movement.
They were part of a sophisticated intellectual defense of a system that
drew substantial political support in North Carolina and throughout
the United States from the early twentieth century to the post-World
War II era.10
In North Carolina and nationwide, public knowledge of and
anger towards the history of forced and coerced sterilization has
grown dramatically since the early 2000s. A number of events in the
early 2000s increased public awareness. In recent years, the story of
sterilization has been told in growing detail. These stories typically
begin by discussing the early twentieth-century cases that successfully
challenged sterilization programs11 and then trace the development of
jurisprudence from Buck v. Bell in 192712 to Skinner v. Oklahoma in
1942.13 They often highlight the persistence of the eugenics movement
into the 1970s.14 Work to address past injustices and support for
reparations has increased along with knowledge about sterilization
programs. Within North Carolina, historian Johanna Schoen brought
new details about the state’s program to light.15 Schoen’s research
formed the basis for the Winston-Salem Journal’s serial coverage
beginning around 2002, which highlighted the experience of
individual victims of state-sponsored involuntary sterilizations.16

9. Id. at 250 (quoting Act of April 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 16, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345,
35, repealed by Act of Apr. 17, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 1, 2003 Sess. Laws 11, 11).
10. See, e.g., PHILLIP A. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 99–100, 137–39 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Stephen Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bell, and the History of Equal
Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 106–11 (2005).
12. See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL, at ix–xiv (2008) (discussing the primary actors
and underlying motivations behind Buck v. Bell and highlighting the historical
implications of the decision).
13. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND
THE NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 13–16 (2008) (discussing the historical
backdrop surrounding Skinner v. Oklahoma and the eugenics movement in the United
States).
14. See JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE & COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL,
STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 241–45 (2004);
GREGORY MICHAEL DORR, SEGREGATION’S SCIENCE: EUGENICS AND SOCIETY IN
VIRGINIA 221–24 (2008).
15. See generally SCHOEN supra note 14 (documenting the role of the state in
promoting sterilization and the eugenics movement in North Carolina).
16. The serial coverage began in December 2002, when the Winston-Salem Journal
published “Against Their Will.” Against Their Will, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 9, 2002),
http://www.journalnow.com/specialreports/againsttheirwill/ [https://perma.cc/BKF5M34Y]; see also SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 18–19.
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These revelations have catalyzed public officials to acknowledge
the harm caused by state-sponsored sterilization programs. In May
2002, Virginia Governor Mark Warner apologized for Virginia’s role
in sterilization;17 that was shortly followed by an apology by Oregon
Governor John Kitzhaber for Oregon’s role in sterilization in
December 2002.18 North Carolina Governor Mike Easley issued an
apology to victims in December of the same year.19 These statements
were followed by apologies in January 2003 by South Carolina
Governor Jim Hodges20 and in March 2003 by California Governor
Gray Davis.21 The Georgia legislature issued a formal apology in
March 2007,22 and the Indiana State Health Commissioner apologized
in April 2007.23 Similarly, the United Methodist Church apologized in
2008 for its support of eugenics.24
In this context of increased public awareness, this Article seeks
to trace the history of the eugenics movement within North Carolina.
We first analyze the origins of the sterilization mindset of the early
twentieth century, locating the push for sterilization in a combination
17. Virginia Governor Apologizes for Eugenics Law, USA TODAY (May 2, 2002,
11:15 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/02/virginia-eugenics.htm [https://
perma.cc/GG7K-46CZ].
18. Apology for Oregon Forced Sterilizations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/03/nation/na-sterile3 [https://perma.cc/5BZC-6WHK].
19. Governor Easley wrote, “On behalf of the state I deeply apologize to the victims
and their families for this past injustice, and for the pain and suffering they had to endure
over the years.” Kevin Begos, Danielle Deaver & John Railey, Easley Apologizes to
Sterilization Victims, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A1; Jon Elliston, The state’s
sterilizations, INDY WEEK (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/the-statessterilizations/Content?oid=1188229 [https://perma.cc/2Z2M-B358]. North Carolina also
repealed legislation that permitted the involuntary sterilization of developmentally
disabled adults. Act of Apr. 17, 2003, ch. 13, 2003 N.C. Sess. Law 11.
20. Peter Irons, Forced Sterilization a Stain on California, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/16/opinion/oe-irons16 [https://perma.cc/ST82-2UD9].
21. Carl Ingram, State Issues Apology for Policy of Sterilization, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/local/me-sterile12 [https://perma.cc/6QFLXVLY]; see also Mark G. Bold, Editorial, It’s Time for California to Compensate Its
Forced-Sterilization Victims, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-bold-forced-sterilization-compensation-20150306-story.html
[https://perma.cc/39BW-J27N] (noting the 2003 apology by Governor Gray Davis).
22. S. Res. 247, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007) (“[B]E IT RESOLVED
BY THE SENATE that the members of this body express their profound regret for
Georgia’s participation in the eugenics movement and the injustices done under eugenics
laws, including the forced sterilization of Georgia citizens.”).
23. Ken Kusmer, Indiana Apologizes for Role in Eugenics, WASH. POST (Apr. 13,
2007, 9:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/13
/AR2007041300259_pf.html [https://perma.cc/ZG3D-Y3QR].
24. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, RESOLUTION 3184: REPENTANCE FOR SUPPORT
OF EUGENICS (2008), reprinted in THE BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH 312–18 (2012).
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of threads, from concern with government expenditures on social
welfare spending to unabashed white supremacy. Initially, the state
courts resisted this movement, but as support grew—from the college
classroom to the popular press—the balance shifted. Particularly in
the wake of decisions in Michigan, Virginia, and the United States
Supreme Court, eugenics gained substantial support among courts
and legislatures.
This Article explores North Carolina’s role in the eugenics
movement and the long road to North Carolina’s reparations
program.25 Between 1929 and 1974, North Carolina authorized the
sterilization of nearly 7,600 people under the state’s 1929 sterilization
law and subsequent North Carolina Eugenics Board program.26 North
Carolina ranked third nationwide in the number of people sterilized;
only California and Virginia sterilized more people.27 While North
Carolina joined this movement and vigorously promoted sterilization,
some voices were raised in opposition, particularly in law reviews.
Even though the Supreme Court of the United States turned against
sterilization in 1942, sterilization in North Carolina continued for
decades, even after many other states had abandoned this practice.28
While this Article maps the nationwide movement for
sterilization, from its beginnings and growth through the increasing
opposition and eventual decline, the focus of this Article is North
Carolina’s role in the movement. Through this lens, North Carolina
serves as an example of how legal theory morphed into a
comprehensive state program of sterilization. This Article seeks to

25.
26.

See infra Section VI.A (discussing the North Carolina reparations program).
THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMP. FOR
VICTIMS OF N.C.’S EUGENICS BD., FINAL REPORT 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT], http://www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/FinalReport
-GovernorsEugenicsCompensationTaskForce.pdf [https://perma.cc/535C-H3FX]. While there
are no documented sterilization procedures under North Carolina’s first sterilization law
of 1919, forty-nine people were sterilized pursuant to the state’s 1929 sterilization law
prior to the Supreme Court of North Carolina striking it down as unconstitutional in 1933.
Id. As part of the revised 1933 sterilization law, the general assembly created a fivemember Eugenics Board to oversee the state’s sterilization program. Id.; see infra Section
V.B. (discussing the 1933 sterilization law and administration of sterilization in North
Carolina).
27. Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/redress-weighed-for-forced-sterilizationsin-north-carolina.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5QYV-V4PD].
28. See Kevin Begos, Lifting the Curtain on a Shameful Era, WINSTON-SALEM J.
(Dec. 9, 2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/lifting-the-curtain-on-ashameful-era/article_fa19404e-8fdf-11e2-8fba-0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/4LBZG9C5] (noting that North Carolina’s sterilization program was unique compared to those
in other states due to its dramatic expansion after 1945).
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understand how North Carolina government actors selected people
for sterilization, approved sterilization, and carried out the
procedures. There remain unanswered questions as to the
circumstances of individual sterilizations in the state.
Despite North Carolina’s long history with eugenics—or maybe
in part because of it—our state has recently taken the lead in
providing compensation for sterilization victims. To conclude, this
Article turns to the North Carolina reparations program which has
provided for compensation for sterilization victims.29 Drawing from
the North Carolina precedent, we make the case for legislative action
to provide reparations in other states. Even if claimants cannot
demonstrate that the sterilization was wholly “involuntary,” they
should still be able to receive relief. Also, this Article suggests
limiting factors that counsel in favor of compensation for sterilization
victims without opening the door to reparations claims in other
settings.
I. THE EUGENICS ERA
A. The Sterilization Mindset: 1910s and 1920s
The idea of state-compelled sterilizations emerged with strength
in the 1910s from several lines of thought. A review of the eugenics
literature during this period reveals three primary motivations behind
what could be termed the “sterilization mindset”: first, the search for
scientific solutions to human problems; second, the growing
population of non-white people in the United States and worldwide
posed threats to white supremacy; and third, the belief that
sterilization would reduce government expenditures and thus was
justified under a cost-benefit analysis. Together, these motivations
served as the driving force behind the eugenics movement in the
United States.
First, the search for scientific solutions to human problems
represents a common theme within eugenics literature. One of the
first such works in the United States was published by Harvard
University Zoology Professor Charles Davenport, who wrote in the
first decade of the twentieth century about eugenics in The Science of
Human Improvement by Better Breeding.30 This brief work focused on
what traits are inherited and how likely offspring are to inherit a
29.
30.

See infra Section VI.A (discussing the North Carolina reparations program).
C.B. DAVENPORT, EUGENICS: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN IMPROVEMENT BY
BETTER BREEDING (1910).
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particular trait.31 Davenport framed this study as fairly neutral,
designed to inform those thinking about marriage and whether their
partner would help them have healthy and intelligent children.32 The
upshot of the pamphlet was to warn that mentally disabled parents
would likely have mentally disabled children, too.33 It was a short step
from advising potential parents of the likely outcome of a marriage to
the more general concern by the state of reproduction and control
over the rights of people it deemed undesirable.
The literature during this period built upon the supposed
inheritance of mental deficiency, providing a critical justification for
the eugenics movement. Henry Goddard’s 1912 book The Kallikak
Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness popularized the
idea that mental ability and criminal tendencies were inherited traits
and that people of low intelligence and those predisposed to crime
were more likely to have “feeble-minded” children than those of high
intelligence.34 Goddard’s book was followed in 1915 by a study of the
Juke family by Arthur Estabrook.35 Vignettes about families like the
Kallikaks and the Jukes were so popular that they were repeated by
local officials seeking to support the case for sterilization.36 In 1918,
Paul Popenoe, a eugenics activist educated at Occidental College and
later Stanford University, and University of Pittsburgh Professor
Roswell Hill Johnson, addressed arguments in favor of eugenics in
their textbook Applied Eugenics.37 They built further upon this
common narrative of inherited mental deficiency.38
In the ensuing years, many adherents approached eugenics not
just as a mechanism for human improvement, but also as financially
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14–16.
See HENRY HERBERT GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY: A STUDY IN THE
HEREDITY OF FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 67–69 (1912).
35. See generally ARTHUR HOWARD ESTABROOK, THE JUKES IN 1915 (1916)
(documenting the study of the Juke family in New York).
36. See, e.g., N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES AND PUB. WELFARE, BIENNIAL
REPORT: DECEMBER 1, 1920 TO JUNE 30, 1922, at 99 (1922) (discussing the “Wake
family”). There was, in fact, a small genre of literature that explored the problems across
several generations of families. See, e.g., CHARLES B. DAVENPORT & ARTHUR H.
ESTABROOK, THE NAM FAMILY: A STUDY IN CACOGENICS 1 (1912); CHARLES B.
DAVENPORT & FLORENCE H. DANIELSON, THE HILL FOLK: REPORT ON A RURAL
COMMUNITY OF HEREDITARY DEFECTIVES 1 (1912); see also MARK H. HALLER,
EUGENICS: HEREDITERIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 108 (1963)
(summarizing several family studies).
37. See Paul Popenoe, Preface to the First Edition of PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL
HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS, at v, vi (1st ed. 1918).
38. See POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 84–89.
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conservative public policy. In 1922, the North Carolina State Board of
Public Welfare followed Goddard’s model.39 The Board conducted a
study of a family it labeled the “Wake family” (a pseudonym given
based on their residence in Wake County, where the state capitol of
Raleigh is located).40 After recounting the origins of the parents and
the problems with their five children, the report concluded by arguing
that people like the “Wake family” should be prohibited from having
children.41 It was an argument based on utility and economics:
The tragedy of this story is not so much the drunkenness and
immorality this feebleminded family is responsible for, but the
sheer waste—the lack of any sort of worth-while contribution to
society . . . . Twenty thousand dollars or more has probably
been as heedlessly poured out on this family.
Had Joe and Mary been refused a marriage license on the
ground of feeblemindedness—as is done in a number of
states—and sent to an institution, the State would have been
spared much expense and trouble. Had they been rendered
incapable of having children they could not have been more
diseased than they are, and still society would have been spared
a second generation of their kind.42
Fifteen years later in 1938, the Eugenics Board again turned to the
example of the “Wake family” in a pamphlet to explain the rationale
behind eugenics.43 The Board used the family to demonstrate the

39. See N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES AND PUB. WELFARE, supra note 36, at 98–99.
40. Id. at 99.
41. Id. at 102–03.
42. Id. See generally Anna L. Krome-Lukens, “A Great Blessing to Defective
Humanity”: Women and the Eugenics Movement in North Carolina, 1910–1940 (2009)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina) (discussing the reform impulse in
North Carolina and support for eugenics) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
43. R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA: PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE 9–10
(1938) [hereinafter BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE],
http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p249901coll22/id/417353/rec/3 [https://
perma.cc/RL4V-XTKH]. The Eugenics Board published Eugenical Sterilization in North
Carolina to provide information about basic procedures for sterilization and forms for
public health officials to use in petitioning the Board for permission to sterilize individuals.
Id. at 11–14; see also R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF
EUGENICAL STERILIZATION AND A REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE EUGENICS BOARD
OF NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH JUNE 30, 1935, at 12–15 (1935) [hereinafter BROWN, A
BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION], http://digital.ncdcr
.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p249901coll22/id/417374/show/417354 [https://perma.cc/
L4DV-8LWP].
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costs of public welfare and the cost savings of sterilization.44 This
analysis concluded, “[a]t the end of 1922 . . . the family had cost the
public at least $20,000 . . . . For the cost of around $100.00 the father
and mother of these children could have been sterilized.”45 Such cold
economic calculations were central to the case for sterilization.
Popenoe and Johnson’s college textbook stated the problem in
similarly stark economic terms. The financial burden of caring for
“defectives and delinquents . . . is becoming a heavy one; it will
become a crushing one . . . . The burden can never be wholly
obliterated, but it can be largely reduced by a restriction of the
reproduction of those who are themselves socially inadequate.”46
They argued further that restrictions on personal liberty were
necessary for the preservation of the race.47
Works like Edward Gosney and Paul Popenoe’s Sterilization for
Human Betterment told of the opportunities for harnessing science to
improve lives.48 Gosney and Popenoe’s book, published in 1929, after
California had already sterilized several thousand people, dealt with
the state’s experience with eugenics.49 By minimizing the harms to
individuals and by focusing on the cost saved by California taxpayers,
they made the case for sterilization more generally.50 The need for
sterilization had oddly resulted from improving standards of medical
care, which meant that people, who in previous generations would
have died, now lived to have children.51 The book’s thesis is that “[w]e
need constructive charity along with our present patchwork variety
that tends to increase the burdens of race degeneracy and family
suicide.”52 That is, Gosney and Popenoe wanted a policy that was no
44. BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 43, at 10.
45. Id.
46. POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 173.
47. Id. at 174.
48. E.S. GOSNEY & PAUL POPENOE, STERILIZATION FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT: A
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF 6,000 OPERATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 1909–1920, at viii
(1929). One might note here the shift in book title, from Davenport’s subtitle of The
Science of Human Improvement by Better Breeding to Gosney and Popenoe’s Sterilization
for Human Betterment. Human improvement was key to both books, but in Davenport’s
1910 pamphlet the improvement was primarily through voluntary action. See
DAVENPORT, supra note 30, at 3–4. But see id. at 33–34 (noting sterilization may be
needed for criminals as well as the mentally ill). For Gosney and Popenoe, improvement
was to come through compulsory sterilization. See GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra, at 116
(outlining the justifications for sterilization in the interest of the state).
49. GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra note 48, at ix–x.
50. Id. at 129–31.
51. Id. at v.
52. Id.
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longer “patchwork” charity designed to address poverty and need
once a child had been born; in its place, they wanted a policy that
stopped some from having children and encouraged others of “good
stock” to have more.53
Second, the eugenics literature also lamented the decline of the
white race. Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson’s 1918 college
textbook, Applied Eugenics, opened in apocalyptic terms with
reference to the demographic catastrophe of the recent world war and
the threatened decline of the white race.54 Popenoe and Johnson
distilled an argument that had been extensively developed by others.
Even before the Great War, there was a robust literature warning of
the decline of white supremacy. Madison Grant’s The Passing of the
Great Race, published in 1916, was an important popular work that
raised the fear that the Nordic race was being overwhelmed,
particularly in the United States.55
Grant’s argument was amplified by other literature that warned
of non-European people increasing in proportion to Europeans in the
wake of the World War.56 One of the most dramatic examples of this
literature was Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against
White Supremacy, published in 1920 by Charles Scribner’s Sons.57 The
introductory paragraph laid out the dire situation, as Stoddard saw it,
associated with the decline of the power of people of European
descent.58 Europeans had as recently as 1914 dominated Europe,
North America, and Australia.59 Drawing from the extensive reach of
the European colonial powers and their American counterpart,
Stoddard presented a story of white supremacy in which “vast areas
inhabited by uncounted myriads of dusky folk obeyed the white
53.
54.

Id. at 122–24.
Edward Alsworth Ross, Introduction to POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at

xi.
55. See JONATHAN PETER SPIRO, DEFENDING THE MASTER RACE:
CONSERVATION, EUGENICS, AND THE LEGACY OF MADISON GRANT 167 (2009). See
generally MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1916) (arguing the
Nordic race was in decline in the United States due to the influx of immigrants).
56. See SPIRO, supra note 55, at 167; Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution:
Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 1900–1930, 16 L. & HIST.
REV. 63, 98–99 (1998).
57. See generally LOTHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST
WHITE WORLD-SUPREMACY (1920) (warning of the decline of the white race due to the
population growth and migration of people of other races).
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. (“Judged by accepted canons of statecraft, the white man towered the
indisputable master of the planet. Forth from Europe’s teeming mother-hive the
imperious Sons of Japhet had swarmed for centuries to plant their laws, their customs, and
their battle-flags at the uttermost ends of the earth.”).
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man’s will.”60 Much had changed in only a few years. In the wake of
World War I, the power of people of European descent was declining
as their former colonies began to loosen the bonds of colonialism.
Something needed to be done about it. The answer was found partly
in eugenics.
Stoddard’s message of white supremacy reached a wide
audience, infusing the debate surrounding the eugenics movement.
Scribner’s, an important trade press, published The Rising Tide of
Color, facilitating access to the general public.61 Another indicator
that Stoddard had reached a public audience is his appearance in F.
Scott Fitzgerald’s novel, The Great Gatsby. Tom Buchanan, a
character in that novel who was known more for his impulsive action
than his thoughtfulness, spoke about eugenics.62 But he combined
Henry Goddard’s name with a misstatement of Lothrop Stoddard’s
book title when he asked, “Have you read ‘The Rise of the Colored
Empires’ by this man Goddard?”63 Goddard’s book title was The
Kallikak Family.64 It was Stoddard’s book that was titled The Rising
Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy.65 Fitzgerald’s
reference suggests (in addition to the fact that Tom Buchanan was not
very serious as a thinker or reader) that both Goddard’s Kallikak
Family and Stoddard’s Rising Tide of Color were on Buchanan’s mind
just as the concern for white supremacy was on the minds of
Americans in the 1920s.
Stoddard made several references to eugenics in The Rising Tide
of Color, including in its conclusion.66 Echoing W.E.B. Du Bois, but
60. Id. Stoddard began his scholarly life criticizing the Haitian Revolution, which had
freed Haiti from slavery and French colonialism. See T. LOTHROP STODDARD, THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO, at vii (1914).
61. Originally founded in 1846, Charles Scribner’s Sons was a prominent publishing
company during this period and published the works of several prominent authors at the
time, including Ring Larder, Earnest Hemingway, Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, and F. Scott
Fitzgerald. See About Scribner, SCRIBNER, http://www.simonandschusterpublishing.com/
scribner/about-scribner.html [https://perma.cc/Z4MN-THG9].
62. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 13 (1925).
63. Id. Buchanan goes on to explain that, “it’s a fine book and everybody ought to
read it. The idea is if we don’t look out the white race will be—will be utterly submerged.
It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.” Id. One wonders whether the fact that Scribner’s
published Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, as well as Madison Grant’s The Passing of the
Great Race and Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color, influenced Fitzgerald’s reference to
Stoddard.
64. GODDARD, supra note 34.
65. STODDARD, supra note 57.
66. Id. at 306; see also id. at 220 (“Bolsheivism has vowed the proletarianzation of the
world, beginning with the white peoples. To this end it not only foments social revolution
within the white world itself, but it also seeks to enlist the colored races in its grand assault
on civilization.”).
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viewing the issue from the other side of the color line, Stoddard wrote
in his preface:
The world-wide struggle between the primary races of
mankind—the “conflict of color” as it has been happily
termed—bids fair to be the fundamental problem of the
twentieth century, and great communities like the United States
of America, the South African Confederation, and Australasia
regard the “color question” as perhaps the gravest problem of
the future.67
In the conclusion, Stoddard linked the fate of the white race to that of
eugenics. He looked forward to a future when white Americans
would “take in hand the problem of race-depredation, and
segregation of defectives and abolition of handicaps penalizing the
better stock . . . .”68 At that point, he argued, “[I]t will be possible to
inaugurate positive measures of race-betterment which will
unquestionably yield the most wonderful results.”69
The white supremacy literature advanced two central themes
that informed the underlying goals of the eugenics movement: first,
the need to address the proliferation of undesirable non-European
people, and second, the need for people of European descent to have
more children. Popenoe and Johnson’s textbook, Applied Eugenics,
argued that well-educated people (particularly women) were not
having enough children.70 However, the eugenics literature also
addressed the need for restrictions on reproduction for some people
of all races. Samuel J. Holmes’ 1921 book, The Trend of the Race,
argued that “[t]he fact that defective mentality is strongly transmitted
is established beyond the possibility of sane objection, and the
particularly disastrous results that are pretty sure to follow from the
mating of two mentally defectives have certainly been made

67. Id. at v (quoting STODDARD, supra note 60, at vii). In support of this claim,
Stoddard quoted the following passage from Du Bois:
These nations and races, composing as they do a vast majority of humanity, are
going to endure this treatment just as long as they must and not a moment longer.
Then they are going to fight and the War of the Color Line will outdo in savage
inhumanity any war this world has yet seen.
Id. at 14 (quoting W. E. Burghardt DuBois, The African Roots of War, 115 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 707, 714 (1915)).
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id.
70. POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 240–42 (concluding that women
educated at elite colleges were harming the future of the white race because they married
less often and later in life).
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sufficiently impressive by the work of recent investigators.”71 For this
reason, the literature on the eugenics movement can be viewed as a
potent mixture of white supremacy, state regulation, and patriarchy.
Faced with these growing concerns, there was a concerted
attempt to use the state’s power to implement such solutions. World
War I, which had seen such extraordinary growth in the power of the
United States and had resulted in such extraordinary destruction of
lives and property in Europe, perhaps taught that generation of
Americans that it was appropriate for the state to exercise such
power. This attitude continued a trend of expansive government
regulation—from regulation of business, such as rates in interstate
commerce, protections for workers, and zoning—that had begun
before the War.72 This same attitude, focused on the supposed good
to the general public, supported the view that the state could and
should circumscribe the rights of individuals.73 And so, over the
71. SAMUEL J. HOLMES, THE TREND OF THE RACE: A STUDY OF PRESENT
TENDENCIES IN THE BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZED MANKIND 40 (1921);
see also Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 141, 141–42 (Mich. 1925).
72. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
CRISIS OF AMERICAN LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1870–1960, at 145–68, 213–46 (1992)
(discussing regulation of property and business during the Progressive era); Paul Kens,
The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire Constitutionalism,
1900–1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 70–73 (1995) (locating the “myth” of the Lochner
era within the time of non-regulation in the Progressive era); see also Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding local regulation of land use
through zoning); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908) (upholding a state statute
that regulated certain working conditions involving women). One might think of the
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), decision as an important counter example,
pointing against government regulation. But Lochner’s vision of restrictions on
government regulation reflects several constitutional strands and even those were not the
exclusive modes of constitutional interpretation in that era. See, e.g., Paul Kens, The
Constitution and Business Regulation in the Progressive Era: Recent Developments and
New Opportunities, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97, 98–101 (2016) (discussing conflicting
interpretations of libertarian, natural law, and originalist elements in Lochner and its
relationship to pro-regulatory ideas). It is now commonplace to see Lochner as a transition
point on the way to Progressive jurisprudence rather than the dominant theme of the
entire era. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 383,
394 (2013) (reviewing BRYAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010)) (discussing literature on Lochner
era). The Court’s reasoning in Lochner was rejected in cases like Muller, 208 U.S. at 423,
and later in cases like Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397, and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). It
is perhaps not coincidental that Justice Holmes, the dissenter in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74,
was the author of the majority in Buck, 272 U.S. at 200. Moreover, particularly after 1910,
there was growing support for pervasive government regulation. And as Herbert
Hovenkamp has shown recently, there were multiple strands of economic thought in
circulation at the time, each of which supported a regulatory approach. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
1870–1970, at 7 (2015).
73. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
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course of the 1920s and 1930s, state legislatures enacted legislation to
provide for widespread sterilization, and courts began to routinely
uphold such legislation.
How the three branches of state government came together to
implement such solutions is discussed at length below. All three
motivations—the quest for scientific solutions to human problems,
the concern for white supremacy, and the belief that the government
could and should address these concerns—merged together to
provide a powerful impetus for the state-sponsored sterilization of
approximately sixty thousand people from the 1920s through the
1950s in the United States.74
B.

Making the Case for Sterilization

The panic in the eugenics and white supremacy literature
translated well into arguments for legislative action. Concerns over
decline of the white race and the need for legislative action were
phrased starkly as concerns over costs of care and the decreasing
mental ability of American citizens.75
One can trace the migration of eugenic ideas into public debate
by looking at the revised and expanded version of Paul Popenoe and
Roswell Johnson’s college textbook, Applied Eugenics, from its first
edition in 1918 to its second edition in 1933.76 The book made the case
for sterilization with an attack on the common people, arguing that
the wealthier and better-educated people were being overtaken by
the common people.77 For instance, the authors focused on the
fertility of women educated at elite colleges, noting that welleducated women were having too few children.78 They noted that
“[s]ince the greatest eugenics wastage at the present time is among
college-educated women, these need particular help to orient

74. MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (2007); Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt
Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1439, 1446 (1981)
(emphasizing the role of “scientific” thought in Buck v. Bell and its contribution to the
case).
75. See infra Section II.B.
76. See PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL HILL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS, at v (rev.
ed. 1933) (describing the purpose and underlying motivations behind the revised edition).
77. Id. at 136–37 (making the case for negative eugenics); id. at 288–90 (discussing the
impact of immigration on the racial makeup of the United States); Edward Alsworth Ross,
Introduction to POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at xi.
78. See POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra
note 37, at 262–65 (discussing relevant studies on the birth rates of educated women).
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themselves.”79 The authors simultaneously argued that collegeeducated women should be encouraged to have more children, while
other women—and men—should be denied the right to procreation.80
Thus, there was a coercive side of the eugenics story, which both
prevented procreation when people wanted it and encouraged it when
they did not.
In their 1933 revised and expanded version of their textbook,
Popenoe and Johnson provided a series of exercises for students,
which were designed to transfer the eugenics movement from the
classroom into the realm of advocacy. For instance, they asked:
If you were a state legislator, would you think it more
important at your first session to work for a sterilization bill, or
to get appropriations for additional segregation facilities?
Why?81
Inquire of several persons whom you consider ultraconservative and several others whom you consider to be
radically-minded, whether they approve of eugenics. Classify
their answers.82
Discuss in some detail the selective nature of deaths from
automobile accidents.83
If there is a considerable foreign-born population in your
community, tabulate the birth announcements in the
newspapers for a few weeks and classify them, so far as can be
done by family names, on the basis of their nationality.84
Ask 10 students how many brothers and sisters they have. Note
how many of them come from families that are large enough to
perpetuate themselves.85
A philanthropist is contemplating a bequest for the
advancement of eugenics. He is in doubt as to whether he
should leave this to promote (a) research on the genetics of
human traits, or (b) work along educational and legislative lines

79. POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note
37, at 265 (noting the disparity in birth rates among educated women and suggesting that
“education is tending toward race suicide”).
80. POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 136–37, 261; POPENOE & JOHNSON,
supra note 37, at 262–65.
81. POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 408.
82. Id. at 413.
83. Id. at 406.
84. Id. at 407.
85. Id.
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to put the eugenic program into effect. He asks your advice.
What have you to say?86
Which do you think is the superior right: the right of every
individual to marry and have children, or the right of society to
prevent the reproduction of the unfit? Why?87
This was by no means some fringe academic endeavor, but one that
was embraced by academic institutions. During this period, eugenics
was taught at 376 colleges and universities across the country.88
Through this type of “education,” eugenics ideas flowed from popular
culture into the legislature, and then were approved by the courts.89
As Greg Dorr has shown, eugenics ideas were popular and frequently
taught at the University of Virginia from the early 1900s through
World War II.90 At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
famed sociology professor Rupert Vance taught, for several years, a
course on population that addressed “problems of race, immigration,
and eugenics.”91 Even though Vance’s book Human Factors in Cotton
Production attributed problems with rural poverty to environment
rather than heredity,92 Vance’s portrayal of rural poverty and the
difficulty those in poverty faced in struggling out of it seems to have

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. COHEN, supra note 3, at 4; see also POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at v
(noting the prior edition’s “widespread use as a college textbook”).
89. Popenoe and Johnson’s conclusion was that the state would sometimes need to
exercise its power coercively. See POPENOE & JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 136 (“Every
facility should be available to undesirable parents for the prevention of conception, but
when they are unwilling to control their own fecundity the state will in some cases have to
intervene by selective sterilization.”). University of California at Berkeley Professor
Samuel J. Holmes’ 1936 textbook Human Genetics and Its Social Import included a final
chapter entitled “Proposed Measures for Race Betterment.” SAMUEL J. HOLMES,
HUMAN GENETICS AND ITS SOCIAL IMPORT 359 (1936). It presented a number of
discussion questions, such as “[d]o you think that any kinds of criminals . . . should be
sterilized on either eugenic or other grounds? . . . In general what kinds of persons, if any,
should be sterilized? . . . Make a list of feasible measures for promoting race betterment.”
Id. at 385–86.
90. DORR, supra note 14, at 70–72, 106–07.
91. See UNIV. OF N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA RECORD: THE
GENERAL CATALOGUE, CATALOGUE ISSUE 1937–1938, at 224 (1938), http://library
.digitalnc.org/cdm/ref/collection/yearbooks/id/12731 [https://perma.cc/6FT8-WTLV]; UNIV. OF
N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA RECORD: THE GENERAL CATALOGUE,
CATALOGUE ISSUE 1938–1939, at 263 (1939), http://library.digitalnc.org/cdm/ref/collection
/yearbooks/id/12897 [https://perma.cc/G93F-8URB].
92. RUPERT B. VANCE, HUMAN FACTORS IN COTTON CULTURE: A STUDY IN THE
SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 295 (1929) (“There exists a kind of
natural harmony about the cotton system. Its parts fit together so perfectly as to suggest
the fatalism of design.”).
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supported the idea that something had to be done, perhaps through
eugenics.93 Before Vance, the course was taught by T.J. Woofter,94
whose 1933 book Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life spoke of
problems with assimilation of foreign-born migrants.95
C.

The Legal Mindset: 1910s and 1920s

The ideas generated in the public and scholarly eugenics
movement migrated quickly into the legislative and judicial spheres.
The first eugenics legislation in the United States was passed in 1907
in Indiana.96 By 1922, Harry Laughlin presented a model sterilization
statute in his extended study, Eugenical Sterilization in the United
States.97 He later described sterilization as an important component of
state policy “to control both the quality and quantity of its future
population.”98 Laughlin acknowledged in 1926 that Michigan and
Virginia had already upheld broad eugenics laws99 and suggested that
the legislation should apply to people in both state institutions and
the community.100 His pamphlet provided two new model statutes
based on what courts had already upheld.101
State courts showed substantial unease with eugenics legislation
in the 1910s and early 1920s. Courts reviewed two different types of
statutes during this time: statutes that provided for sterilization of
criminals and statutes that provided for sterilization of
developmentally disabled people. Analysis of criminal sterilization
considered whether sterilization was cruel and unusual punishment
and whether imposition of a particular sterilization violated a criminal

93. See Stephen Fender, Poor Whites and the Federal Writers’ Project: The Rhetoric of
Eugenics in the Southern Life Histories, in POPULAR EUGENICS: NATIONAL EFFICIENCY
AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930S, at 140, 148 (Susan Currell & Christina
Cogdell eds., 2006).
94. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA RECORD: THE GENERAL
CATALOGUE, CATALOGUE ISSUE 1936–1937, at 211 (1937), http://library.digitalnc.org/
cdm/ref/collection/yearbooks/id/12707 [https://perma.cc/NCD9-QY4Q].
95. T.J. WOOFTER JR., RACES AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN AMERICAN LIFE 4 (1933).
96. Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907 Ind. Acts 377 (authorizing “the sterilization of
mentally defective persons”) (repealed 1974). A fairly comprehensive list of state eugenics
statutes appears in F.C.N., Constitutional Law—Police Power—Sterilization of Defectives,
22 GEO. L.J. 616, 617 (1933–1934).
97. HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
446–51 (1922) (providing model sterilization statute).
98. HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION: 1926, at 2 (1926).
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id. at 64–75.
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defendant’s right to due process.102 Analysis of non-criminal
sterilization focused on equal protection challenges—allegations that
some similarly situated people were not being sterilized.103
Legal scholars debate whether Lochner v. New York104 and its
jurisprudential era during the early twentieth century, remembered
for its emphasis on “economic liberty,” facilitated the demise of
substantive due process rights in favor of the general welfare105 or was
actually a precursor to the establishment of the fundamental rights
doctrine in the Warren court.106 While the eugenics cases of the early
twentieth century do not answer such larger questions, they
demonstrate that Griswold v. Connecticut107 was not the first time that
the courts wrestled with whether a person has a right to make his or
her own choices about whether to beget children.108 The courts
articulated their concerns stridently in these early stages of
sterilization decisions, albeit in their own language, on both criminal
and non-criminal sterilizations. But across the country, states
subsequently lowered their voices and changed the subject.
Substantive questions turned to concerns about process as more and
more statutes came before state courts. The focus was no longer on
use of sterilization for punishment, but rather on general welfare.
Slowly, the legal community went the way of popular thinking at the
time and ultimately sanctioned sterilization statutes. While courts
initially expressed skepticism of eugenics, they increasingly accepted
sterilization programs as a valid exercise of state power.
1. The “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Perspective
The first appellate case to address the constitutionality of
sterilization legislation was the Washington Supreme Court’s 1912

102. See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 690 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry, 216 F.
413, 415–16 (S.D. Iowa 1914), vacated as moot sub nom, Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468, 469–
70 (1917); State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75, 76–77 (Wash. 1912).
103. See Smith v. Bd. of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 967 (N.J. 1913); infra
Section II.C.2.
104. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
105. Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process,
93 TEX. L. REV. 275, 276–81 (2014); see also David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A
Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1469, 1470–71 (2005) (discussing the
traditional understanding of Lochner and its progeny).
106. David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 52–58 (2003); Randy E. Barnett,
The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 487–89 (2004).
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
108. See id. at 494–96.
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opinion in State v. Feilen,109 which upheld a statute allowing
vasectomies to be performed on men convicted of rape.110 The court
held that since the crime was so heinous and vasectomies were
relatively painless, the procedure was not cruel punishment.111 The
court analyzed the issue as a balance between individual liberty and
public welfare: “[W]e cannot hold that vasectomy is such a cruel
punishment as cannot be inflicted upon appellant for the horrible and
brutal crime [of rape] which he has been convicted.”112
In another early case, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa in Davis v. Berry113 provided an extensive
articulation of why sterilization is cruel and unusual punishment due
to its infringement on a person’s basic rights:
[E]ach operation is to destroy the power of procreation. It is, of
course, to follow the man during the balance of his life. The
physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only
test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the
mental suffering are always present and known by all the
public, and will follow him wheresoever he may go. This
belongs to the Dark Ages.114
The court drew particular emphasis on the degradation of the
human body that accompanies sterilization.115 The court went so far as
to imply that there exists a fundamental right to beget children,
holding that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on a man’s right
“to enter into the marital relation.”116 The United States District
Court for the District of Nevada drew a similar conclusion in its 1918
decision Mickle v. Henrichs.117 Applying this logic to the prisoner
found guilty of rape, the court stated “[t]rue, rape is an infamous
crime; the punishment should be severe; but even for such an
offender the way to an upright life, if life is spared, should not be
unnecessarily obstructed.”118 By arguing that sterilization “obstructs”
a person’s ability to lead an upright life, the court conceptualized
procreation as fundamental to living life.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 78.
216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), vacated as moot, Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
Id. at 416.
See id. (discussing the historical use of castration as a form of punishment).
See id. at 419.
262 F. 687, 690 (D. Nev. 1918) (quoting Davis, 216 F. at 416).
Id. at 691.
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2. Fundamental Rights in Equal Protection Challenges
Sterilization statutes also raised constitutional concerns under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Equal protection challenges to
sterilization statutes arose from individuals being institutionalized for
“feeble-mindedness” or other mental health reasons, as opposed to
the cruel and unusual punishment challenges furthered by convicted
criminals. Courts were quick to note that the state, by having a
sterilization option for only those confined to state institutions and
not for those people with the same ailments living outside institutions,
was treating people in the same class differently.119 In its In re
Thompson120 decision in 1918, the Albany County Supreme Court of
the State of New York held a sterilization board unconstitutional on
the grounds that “[t]he law certainly denies to some persons of a class
and similarly situated the protection which is afforded to others of the
same class.”121 In the same year, the Michigan Supreme Court struck
down a similar statute on similar grounds, explaining:
[T]he Legislature selected out of what might be termed a
natural class of defective and incompetent persons only those
already under public restraint, leaving immune from its
operation all others of like kind to whom the reason for the
legislative remedy is normally and equally, at least, applicable,
extending immunities and privileges to the latter which are
denied to the former.122
Moreover, these courts found that the class distinction did not
accomplish the objectives for which the sterilization program was
established, since institutionalized persons were less likely to
procreate than non-institutionalized people anyway.123
But the discussion often extended beyond the unreasonableness
of this distinction into the realm of why sterilization raised such large

119. See, e.g., In re Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. 638, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918), aff’d sub nom.,
Osborn v. Thomson, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit
Judge, 166 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. 1918).
120. 169 N.Y.S. 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918).
121. Id. at 644.
122. Haynes, 166 N.W. at 940.
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913)
(“The objection, however, is not that the class is small as compared with the magnitude of
the purpose in view, which is nothing less than the artificial improvement of society at
large, but that it is singularly inept for the accomplishment of that purpose in this respect,
viz., that if such object requires the sterilization of the class so selected, then a fortiori does
it require the sterilization of the vastly greater class who are not protected from
procreation by their confinement in state or county institutions.”).
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concerns in the first place. In In re Thompson, the New York court
declared that:
The entire purpose of the enactment seems to be to save
expense to future generations in the operation of eleemosynary
institutions . . . . Such does not seem to this court to be the
proper exercise of the police power. It seems to be a tendency
almost inhuman in its nature.124
The Supreme Court of New Jersey likewise labeled its state’s
sterilization statute inhumane, noting “[t]he palpable inhumanity and
immorality of such a scheme forbids us to impute it to an enlightened
Legislature.”125 The court’s opinion foreshadowed just how dangerous
involuntary sterilization could be for society:
There are other things besides physical or mental diseases that
may render persons undesirable citizens, or might do so in the
opinion of a majority of a prevailing Legislature. Racial
differences, for instance, might afford a basis for such an
opinion in communities where that question is unfortunately a
permanent and paramount issue.126
The court clearly stated that once the government starts
sterilizing on “feeble-mindedness” grounds, race and poverty could
logically follow as valid reasons to refuse the right of procreation.
This prediction was eerily prescient considering that a
disproportionate number of people sterilized in North Carolina were
indeed poor and black.127
3. From Substantive Concerns to Procedural Safeguards
After these early cases, however, the tone began to shift. Courts
struggled with the distinction between this new idea of substantive
rights, which the United States Supreme Court had not yet fully
articulated, particularly in the context of reproductive rights, and the
simpler option of invalidating statutes on procedural due process
grounds. Davis v. Berry opinion illustrates this tension:
One of the rights of every man of sound mind is to enter into
the marriage relation. Such is one of his civil rights, and
124. In re Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. at 644.
125. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. at 967.
126. Id. at 966.
127. Gregory N. Price & William A. Darity Jr., The Economics of Race and Eugenic
Sterilization in North Carolina: 1958–1968, 8 ECON. & HUM. BIOLOGY 261, 269 (2010)
(observing that as the percentage of a county’s African American population grew so too
did the number of sterilizations in the 1960s).
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deprivation or suspension of any civil right for past conduct is
punishment for such conduct, and this fulfills the definition of a
bill of attainder, because a bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a jury trial.128
In one breath, the court implied that every person has a right to have
children (through marital relations) and, at the same time, stated that
the reason for the sterilization statute’s invalidity is the lack of due
process afforded by a jury trial. The court was quick to jump from the
idea of liberty to a procedural argument.
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court struck down its
sterilization statute on grounds that inmates were not afforded due
process.129 The hearings were held in secret and inmates had no
opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses.130 But in
its discussion, the court wrestled with its inclination to invalidate the
statute on individual liberty grounds.131
These opinions suggest that the courts wanted to make
substantive rights arguments, but understood that procedural findings
were easier to justify. Alternatively, these decisions could be
explained by the absence of substantive due process rights outside of
property and contracts and the evolving view of the courts on
individual rights within this realm.132
II. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR STERILIZATION
The era of judicial skepticism drew to a close in the wake of the
popular literature on eugenics, the legislation sweeping the country,
and law review commentary. The Michigan Supreme Court and
Supreme Court of Virginia both upheld sterilization statutes on
substantive due process grounds.133 The relevant law reviews in these
two states recommended and endorsed the rationale of those
decisions, followed by legal scholars across the country.134 And finally,
the United States Supreme Court officially held that a state’s
involuntary sterilization program, if effectuated pursuant to some
128. Id. at 419.
129. Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (Ind. 1921).
130. Id.
131. See id. (“[W]holly aside from the proposition of cruel and unusual punishment,
and infliction of pains and penalties by the legislative body through an administrative
board, it is very plain that this act is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution in that it denies appellee due process.”).
132. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 10 (1998).
133. See infra Section II.A.
134. See infra Section II.B.
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kind of set process, was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.135
A. State Courts Establish a New Framework for Analyzing
Sterilization
The first major robust defense of eugenics legislation by a state
court came from the Michigan Supreme Court in 1925 in Smith v.
Command.136 The court moved systematically through each of the
legal challenges to sterilization: reasonable use of the police power,137
cruel and unusual punishment,138 equal protection,139 and procedural
due process.140
The thrust of the holding in Smith was that the sterilization law
fell within the ambit of Michigan’s police power because controlling
feeble-mindedness was in the public interest.141 The court started by
setting out two issues as conclusive facts: first, feeble-mindedness is
hereditary, making sterilization an unquestionably effective means of
decreasing the defect within the population;142 and second, feebleminded people are indisputably “a serious menace to society,”
because eight times as many lived in Michigan as could be
institutionalized.143 These assertions disregarded any scientific
distinctions that could be made between different types of mental
disorders and assumed that institutionalization was the only option
for dealing with people suffering from mental disorders.144
Under this framework, the Michigan Supreme Court evaluated
the right to beget children against the public’s interest in preventing
the procreation of feeble-minded individuals. The court recognized
that “[i]t is true that the right to beget children is a natural and
constitutional right.”145 However, the court quickly qualified this
natural right: “Measured by its injurious effect upon society, what
right has any citizen or class of citizens to beget children with an
inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, idiocy, or

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See infra Section II.C.
204 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1925).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144–46.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 142.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 142.
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imbecility?”146 In sum, it is reasonable for the legislature to remove
the ability of these people to procreate because they have no right to
have children who will certainly have mental defects and thereby
impose a burden on the state.147 By qualifying the right to beget
children, the court was able to quell the lingering questions raised by
other courts.
The majority next turned to the cruel and unusual punishment
issue. The court determined that sterilization was analogous to
vaccination, and thus not punitive.148 Part of the rationale for this
conclusion was that the operations were not particularly painful to the
patients, and thus, “the results are beneficial both to the subject and
to society.”149 Recognizing that other courts had disagreed with this
position, the majority took careful steps to distinguish the Michigan
law from those in other states. The majority noted this law was unlike
the laws at issue in Davis v. Berry and State v. Feilen,150 because in
those cases the law only imposed sterilization on convicted felons, not
people who were institutionalized only for feeble-mindedness.151
The majority also addressed whether the sterilization statute
violated the equal protection clause on grounds that it did not apply
to all mental defectives.152 The statute defined the class of people who
would be affected by sterilization as follows:
(a) That the said defective manifests sexual inclinations which
make it probable that he will procreate children unless he be
closely confined, or be rendered incapable of procreation; (b)
That children procreated by said adjudged defective will have
an inherited tendency to mental defectiveness; and (c) That
there is no probability that the condition of said person will

146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 142.
149. Id. at 142–43.
150. Id. at 142 (citing Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 414 (S.D. Iowa 1914), vacated as
moot, Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75, 76 (Wash. 1912)).
151. Id. The court also concluded the holding in Smith v. Board of Examiners was
irrelevant in this context because it dealt only with epileptics and did not arrive at the
cruel and unusual punishment argument. Id.; see Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of FeebleMinded, 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913). Furthermore, the court distinguished the law at issue
in Mickle v. Henrichs from the Michigan law because it only applied to people who had
raped children under 10 years old. Smith, 204 N.W. at 142; see Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F.
687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918).
152. Smith, 204 N.W. at 143.
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improve so that his or her children will not have the inherited
tendency aforesaid . . . .153
This classification is actually narrower than if the statute had enforced
sterilization on all mental defectives. Thus, it ensures that there is a
reason for conducting the sterilization, because the sterilized person’s
children would also need to be institutionalized for being mentally
defective.154 Again, the court analogized the statute to existing public
health regulations, finding that it was reasonable for the legislature to
apply the statute to people most likely to pass on mental defects, just
as the legislature was justified in requiring vaccinations of people
most likely to be afflicted with smallpox.155 In both this argument and
the cruel and unusual punishment argument, the court depicted
mental deficiencies as purely medical problems, thereby facilitating
justification of a “medical” remedy through sterilization.156 Again, the
court shifted the analysis away from a discussion of fundamental
liberty and into one about “procedure,” this time a medical
procedure.
The court’s equal protection analysis did conclude that a second
section of the statute was invalid due to its application to mentally
defective people unable to care for their children without any finding
that the children themselves would be mentally defective.157 The court
took issue with the notion that only poor feeble-minded people would
be subject to this part of the statute; if they were financially able to
support any potential children, then they would not be sterilized. In
that sense, the court observed that the law “carves a class out of the
class,” making poor feeble-minded people subject to different laws
than wealthier feeble-minded people.158 This objection to the law is
particularly noteworthy for North Carolina’s history, where
153. Act of May 25, 1923, Pub. Act No. 285, sec. 7(1), 1923 Mich. Pub. Acts 453, 455
(repealed 1974). The law was entitled “AN ACT to authorize the sterilization of mentally
defective persons.” Id.at 453.
154. See id.
155. Smith, 204 N.W. at 143.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 144. The classification language of this provision was:
(a) That said defective manifests sexual inclinations which make it probable that
he will procreate children unless he be closely confined, or be rendered incapable
of procreation; and (b) that he would not be able to support and care for his
children, if any, and such children would probably become public charges by
reason of his own mental defectiveness.
Act of May 25, 1923, Pub. Act No. 285, sec. 7(2), 1923 Mich. Pub. Acts 453, 455 (repealed
1974).
158. Smith, 204 N.W. at 144.
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preventing the procreation of poor people became a major
justification for the expansion of the eugenics program in later
years.159
The court held that the statute’s procedure for identifying people
to be sterilized did not violate due process.160 The procedure required
service of process upon the person to be sterilized and his or her
relatives (and if no relatives could be found, upon a guardian ad
litem).161 In addition, the statute provided several opportunities for
the person facing sterilization to contest the procedure at a hearing or
a jury trial, upon request, and then on appeal.162 Furthermore, unlike
other states where the determination was relegated to a board or
administrative agency, all sterilization proceedings occurred in the
courts with the added support of a panel of three physicians.163
The Smith court emphasized the importance of deference to the
legislature, recognizing that while sterilization infringes upon a civil
liberty, “our race” faces enormous challenges in sustaining itself:
The Michigan statute is not perfect. Undoubtedly time and
experience will bring changes in many of its workable features.
But it is expressive of a state policy apparently based on the
growing belief that, due to the alarming increase in the number
of degenerates, criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is
facing the greatest peril of all time. Whether this belief is well
founded is not for this court to say. Unless for the soundest
constitutional reasons, it is our duty to sustain the policy which
the state has adopted. As we before have said, it is no valid
objection that it imposes reasonable restraints upon natural and
constitutional rights. It is an historic fact that every forward step
in the progress of the race is marked by an interference with
individual liberties.164
The use of the term “our race” is critical here. The Smith court
initially justified its conclusion by focusing on the imposition of the
costs of institutionalization on the public, which in many ways differs
from the perils of “our race.”165 In their view, the public interest
includes not only plain costs, but also the quality of the human race.
159. See, e.g., BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 43, at 10; SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 134.
160. Smith, 204 N.W. at 144.
161. Act of May 25, 1923, Pub. Act No. 285, sec. 4, 1923 Mich. Pub. Acts 453, 454
(repealed 1974).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Smith, 204 N.W. at 145.
165. See id. at 142.
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The economic argument that justified sterilization of the mentally
disabled aligned naturally with the notion of racial purity that was
starting to take a cultural hold.
Three dissenting justices vigorously objected to the statute on the
grounds that it violated a unique provision of the Michigan
Constitution, requiring that “[i]nstitutions for the benefit of those
inhabitants who are deaf, dumb, blind, feebleminded or insane shall
always be fostered and supported.”166 Since the statute only applied to
those who were segregated with the purpose of releasing them from
the state institutions, sterilizing these people would have removed
their access to the institutions to which they were constitutionally
entitled.167 Justice Howard Wiest, who authored the dissent, thought
sterilization was a relic of the ancient world; after discussing
sterilization in Rome, which had been justified on the costs it saved,
he concluded that “[t]his inhuman law was evidently deemed
eugenistically essential to the welfare of the Roman Republic. It was
eugenics in its infancy, bent on the survival of the fittest.”168
The heart of Justice Wiest’s dissent though was that sterilization
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. He focused his
discussion not on case law, but on how barbaric the practice of
sterilization is, equivalent to savagery and castration, and how it was
rejected by the authors of the Michigan Constitution.169 Justice Wiest
noted that the cruel and unusual punishment clause “struck at the evil
evidenced in man’s inhumanity in the past, and placed a bar at any
renewal thereof, whether in the name of science or penology,
eugenics or human procreation regulation by mutilation.”170
Accordingly, the protections under this clause extend to “all new
forms of cruelty, good or bad intentioned, and all old forms disguised
under new scientific names and theories, and pressed with the zeal
and intolerance of converts obsessed with the fallible wisdom of
questionable opinions.”171
The dissent emphasized that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is a limitation on the police power applicable to all citizens, not
just criminals.172 The dissent also contested the scientific conclusions
adopted by the majority that feeble-mindedness would be inherited

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 146 (Wiest, J., dissenting) (quoting MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 15).
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
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by the offspring of a feeble-minded person, relying on a variety of
scientific studies disputing this finding.173 This argument was an
ardent defense of the right to bodily integrity inherent to all citizens.
Though the jurisprudence of individual rights had not yet developed,
Justice Wiest referred obliquely to the “inherent right of bodily
integrity” in addition to the cruel and unusual punishment clause.174
Wholly absent from the dissent’s discussion, however, was the
question of the public welfare and the dollars and cents required to
provide for the general public. The majority’s analysis in Smith was a
calculus that weighed the overall cost to the individual against the
benefits to society:
It is known by conservative estimate that there are at least
20,000 recognized feeble-minded persons in the State of
Michigan—eight times as many as can be segregated in State
institutions. The Michigan Home and Training School at
Lapeer is full to overflowing with these unfortunates, and
hundreds of others are on the waiting lists. That they are a
serious menace to society no one will question.
In view of these facts, what are the legal rights of this class of
citizens as to the procreation of children? It is true that the right
to beget children is a natural and constitutional right, but it is
equally true that no citizen has any rights superior to the
common welfare. Acting for the public good, the state, in the
exercise of its police powers, may always impose reasonable
restrictions upon the natural and constitutional rights of its
citizens. Measured by its injurious effect upon society, what
right has any citizen or class of citizens to beget children with an
inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, idiocy or
imbecility?175
In short, the court labeled the purity of the human race a “benefit”
and the offspring of mentally defective people a “cost.” The
majority’s transition from discussions of substantive rights to a costbenefit analysis established language that courts could use to analyze
sterilization. That framework concentrated on economics as opposed
to the more nebulous discussion of human liberties that the Smith
dissent used.176

173. Id. at 149–52.
174. Id. at 148.
175. Id. at 142 (majority opinion).
176. Compare id. at 142 (describing the prevalence of “feeble-mindedness” as “a social
and economic problem of grave importance”), with id. at 148 (Weist, J., dissenting)
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The next state to uphold a sterilization statute was Virginia. The
Supreme Court of Virginia’s 1925 decision in Buck v. Bell177 involved
a Virginia law authorizing sterilization of the feeble-minded, among
others.178 The court held that since the statute required an adequate
notice, a hearing, and a right to appeal, it did not violate due
process.179 Additionally, the court held that the law was not penal and
therefore was not cruel and unusual punishment.180 The court also
upheld the statute as a valid use of police power.181 Finally, in
examining the equal protection clause, the court determined that
there was no class distinction since the institutions were open to all
feeble-minded for commitment.182
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided Buck v. Bell on
November 12, 1925, several months after Michigan’s Smith v.
Command.183 The Virginia opinion in Buck disclosed none of the
qualms of the dissenters in Smith; however, it also did not have the
expansive justification seen in Smith. Buck had neither the intra-court
conflict associated with Smith, nor could it be characterized as
providing broad judicial support for sterilization, as was Smith. In
fact, the Virginia court gave great deference to the legislature,
drawing on a well-established judicial deference to legislatures.184
In addition, while the Buck court found that sterilization would
benefit the state, the court also reasoned that it would benefit Carrie
Buck herself.185 Carrie Buck was seventeen years old, the daughter of
a “feeble-minded” mother and the mother of an illegitimate, “feeble(arguing sterilization violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause and “inherent right
of bodily integrity”).
177. 130 S.E. 516 (Va. 1925).
178. Id. at 517.
179. Id. at 518–19.
180. Id. at 519.
181. Id. at 520.
182. Id.
183. Id.; Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140, 140 (Mich. 1925) (decided on June 18,
1925).
184. As Justice George Sutherland wrote in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the
District of Columbia in 1923, “[e]very possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an
act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt.” 261 U.S. 525, 544, 562 (1923)
overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (concluding, ultimately,
that the act was unconstitutional). That was the nature of constitutional law at the time,
which deferred to legislative judgments about efficacy. Some, like Harvard Law Professor
Thomas Reed Powell, understood that “calm as may be the judicial recitals of these issues
of personal liberty, the conflicts are ones that stir men’s souls.” Thomas Reed Powell, The
Supreme Court and the State Police Power, 1922–1930, 17 Va. L. REV. 765, 786 (1931). But
Powell was still ahead of his time; the dominant mode of proceeding was to uphold
sterilization. See infra Part III.A.
185. Buck, 130 S.E. at 518.
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minded” child.186 The court reasoned that, if not sterilized, Carrie
Buck would be institutionalized until she was unable to conceive
(sterilization “by nature”), but with the help of Virginia’s sterilization
program, she would be permitted to leave institutional care earlier in
her life.187 Not surprisingly, the general welfare was the justification
for involuntarily institutionalizing Carrie Buck in the first place.188
Following the decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Buck
case then proceeded to the United States Supreme Court, where state
sterilization programs would receive official judicial approval as a
valid exercise of the police power.189
B.

The Legal Community’s Contributions to, and Acceptance of, the
New Framework

Prior to the decisions in both Smith and Buck, Aubrey Strode, a
young lawyer in Lynchburg, Virginia who would soon become the
lawyer for the state in Buck v. Bell, published a short examination
and defense of the Virginia statute, “Sterilization for Defectives,” in
the Virginia Law Review in 1924.190 Strode took up the question of
whether the state’s police power was broad enough to encompass
sterilization.191 Strode reframed the issue in terms of protecting the
people sterilized from procreation.192 He noted that it was clear that
the state could institutionalize people and thereby prevent them from
having children.193 But, he questioned whether the state could take on
a more active role:
Is this the sole remedy available to organized society? Must
such persons languish for life in custody and must the
government bear the perpetual burden of thus maintaining

186. Id. at 517; see Paul Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 61 (1985) (describing Carrie Buck’s family and
disputing their alleged “feeble-mindedness”). Notably, Lombardo later authored a book
with a similar name. LOMBARDO, supra note 12.
187. Buck, 130 S.E. at 517–18.
188. Later sources have suggested that neither Carrie Buck nor her daughter were
actually “feebleminded” in reality. See Lombardo, supra note 186, at 61. While less is
known about Carrie’s mother, Emma Buck, she was still not even considered to be an
“imbecile” by the medical examiners at the time. Id.
189. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
190. Aubrey E. Strode, Sterilization of Defectives, 11 VA. L. REV. 296, 296 (1925); see
also DORR, supra note 14, at 222–29 (discussing the academic defense of sterilization in
Virginia that surrounded Strode’s advocacy of sterilization); J. Miller Kenyon, Sterilization
for the Unfit, 1 VA. L. REV. 458, 469 (1914) (advocating for the sterilization of the unfit).
191. Strode, supra note 190, at 296.
192. Id.
193. Id.

94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016)

2016]

EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C.

1903

them if it would protect itself against the multiplication of their
kind, and must this be so even when through a simple surgical
operation not appreciably dangerous and involving the removal
of no sound organs from the body such persons might be
discharged from custody and become self supporting to the
great advantage both of themselves and of society?194
Strode posited whether “one liberty” may be “thus restored through
the deprivation of another liberty?”195 Taking a moderate approach,
Strode emphasized that the Virginia statute was based on eugenic
principles, but that it only allowed sterilization when there was a
judicial determination that “the welfare of the inmate also will be
promoted thereby.”196 He subsequently acknowledged, “[t]he field
here is a broad one involving what were formerly at least regarded as
elemental personal rights.”197 Strode’s article appeared as he was
bringing the Buck case as a test of the statute’s constitutionality
through the Virginia courts,198 building on other law review articles as
well as the popular and academic literature on sterilization.199
The legal community chose to follow the majority opinion in
Smith v. Command, not the lengthy, passionate dissent. University of
Michigan Law Professor Burke Shartel’s article “Sterilization of
Mental Defectives,” appeared in the Michigan Law Review in 1925 in
defense, and one might also say, in celebration of Smith.200 In his
article, Shartel provided not only an explanation of the Michigan law
for sterilization, but also a defense of Smith.201 He focused on the
Michigan legislature’s finding of “facts” regarding the effects of
sterilization, arguing that “the court ought to require the facts on the
basis of which the constitutionality of a law is assailed to be
established by the assailant ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”202 Shartel’s
position that courts should be barred from wading into issues of
“fact” contrasts with the more moderate position taken by Strode in
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 301.
197. Id.
198. LOMBARDO, supra note 12, at 112 (noting Strode facilitated the passage of the
sterilization law and led efforts to test the constitutionality of the statute in Virginia
courts).
199. See supra Section I.A (discussing academic literature surrounding sterilization);
infra Section IV.A (discussing law review publications on this subject).
200. Burke Shartel, Sterilization of Mental Defectives, 24 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1925)
[hereinafter Shartel, MICH. L. REV.]. This article was reprinted the following year. Burke
Shartel, Sterilization of Mental Defectives, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537 (1926).
201. Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140, 141 (1925).
202. Shartel, MICH. L. REV., supra note 200, at 21.
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the Virginia Law Review that a sterilization statute should be upheld
if found to be a “reasonable exercise” of police power.203 Under
Shartel’s theory, the cost-benefit analysis employed by legislatures
could not be subject to judicial intervention and courts could only
overturn a statute if the plaintiff demonstrated that the findings of the
legislature were wrong “beyond a reasonable doubt.”204
Shartel, like many other writers in the 1920s, saw a cost-benefit
analysis as an essential part of sustaining a forced sterilization statute.
He minimized the problem—for instance, at one point he wrote that
though there were 20,000 “feeble-minded” persons in the state, “[t]his
would not be too many to sterilize, considering the population as a
whole . . . .”205 Then, following the lead of the Michigan Supreme
Court, Shartel suggested that the issue involved calculating society’s
need:
If the social need be great enough the state can deprive of
liberty (as it does do with the insane, the criminal, the man who
objects to vaccination and so on) or it may take life (as it does
as a penalty for crime or by drafting into the military service
and exposing to death, etc.).206
This cost-benefit analysis allowed little room for humanity. However,
this cold calculus served as one of the primary justifications for the
approval of state-sponsored sterilization in the Supreme Court.
C.

The United States Supreme Court Approves Sterilization

In Buck, the United States Supreme Court leveraged Smith’s
methodological calculus when it decided that sterilization programs
violated neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 The Court hardly
considered the fact that the Virginia law applied differently to people
who were institutionalized, stating “the law does all that is needed
when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within

203. Compare id. (concluding that courts should assume that the legislature acted on
accurate facts with respect to medical science in eugenics challenges), with Strode, supra
note 190, at 301 (raising doubts as to whether the judicial determination of feeblemindedness under the Virginia statute “involve[d] an unreasonable classification”); R.S.L.,
Note, Constitutional Law—Eugenical Sterilization Statutes, 12 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (1926)
(arguing that courts should defer to the judgment of the respective legislature in
concluding whether or not an exercise of the police power is reasonable).
204. Shartel, MICH. L. REV., supra note 200, at 21.
205. Id. at 5.
206. Id. at 18.
207. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 208 (1927).
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the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so
far and so fast as its means allow.”208
On the question of due process, the Court nodded to the notion
that a government action could comply with procedural due process
and yet still violate an individual’s substantive rights: “The attack is
not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law. It seems to be
contended that in no circumstances could such an order be
justified.”209 However, Justice Holmes quickly disposed of such a
notion, finding that if the grounds for conducting a sterilization exist,
then “they justify the result.”210 In contrast to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which had leaned on deference to the legislature in its
reasoning, the United States Supreme Court declared outright the
importance of the State’s interests over those of the individual.211
Justice Holmes emphasized that the rights of an individual to
procreate must be subordinated to the concerns of the State,
juxtaposing the “lesser sacrifice” of not being able to have children
with the all-consuming sacrifice of giving one’s life through the
military draft.212 He pointed out that,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes.213
This opinion propelled the cost-benefit analysis to new heights.
Instead of weighing the benefits to society of being free from feebleminded offspring against the cost of depriving a person of the right to
procreate, the Supreme Court weighed the benefits of protecting
national security against the costs of life. Recasting eugenics in this
patriotic, military context, the cost seemed small and the benefits
quite large. And so, the Supreme Court, after dismissing concerns
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905)).
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raised in the earlier part of the twentieth century,214 ultimately
embraced eugenics as valid, even socially beneficial, government
action. Following the lead of the Court in Buck v. Bell, the state
courts would soon follow suit.
III. THE JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF STERILIZATION, 1927–1930S
In the wake of Buck v. Bell, state legislatures and courts took
their cue from the Supreme Court and began upholding sterilization
legislation more routinely. An American Law Reports article on
sterilization observed the central importance of the case: “Since the
decision of Buck v. Bell . . . upholding the Virginia statute involved in
that case . . . judicial opinion has inclined in favor of the
constitutionality of such statutes, which, up to the time . . . had more
frequently been declared unconstitutional than upheld.”215 However,
sterilization legislation was still subject to certain procedural
limitations. For instance, the 1927 North Carolina sterilization
legislation, which had no provision for hearings, was struck down in
1933 in Brewer v. Valk.216 Meanwhile, other courts upheld statutes
similar to Virginia’s in Buck.217
This tension between Buck’s insistence that sterilization violated
no substantive rights and the concerns for process appear throughout
the case law of the post-Buck era. After Buck, sterilization in and of
itself was not considered a federal constitutional violation, but
challenges to sterilization laws in state courts continued
nonetheless.218 While Buck minimized an individual’s liberty interest
in having children by contrasting it with national security interests,
state courts diminished this liberty interest even further. Likewise,
Buck’s statement that sterilization laws are “not penal” meant that
courts consistently construed these statutes, even when they applied
only to convicted criminals, as wholly separate from the criminal
system—and accordingly, separate from the Constitution’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.219 On the other hand, state courts that
214. See supra Section I.C (discussing early constitutional challenges to state
sterilization statutes).
215. E.W.H., Asexualization or Sterilization of Criminals or Defectives, 87 AM. L. REP.
242, 242–43 (1933).
216. 204 N.C. 186, 192, 167 S.E. 638, 641 (N.C. 1933).
217. See, e.g., State v. Troutman, 299 P. 668, 670 (Idaho 1931); State v. Schaffer, 270 P.
604, 605 (Kan. 1928).
218. See, e.g., Schaffer, 270 P. 604, 604 (Kan. 1928). See generally E.W.H., supra note
215 (summarizing challenges to state sterilization laws following Buck v. Bell).
219. See, e.g., Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 115 P.2d 123, 126 (Okla. 1941), rev’d,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); In re Clayton, 234 N.W. 630, 632 (Neb. 1931).

94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016)

2016]

EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C.

1907

may have been uncomfortable following the liberty argument of Buck
protected individuals by requiring more process.220
A. Expansion of Buck in Substantive Terms
Buck eliminated the equal protection argument as a rationale for
striking state sterilization laws, facilitating the blanket approval of
sterilization programs at the state level. The first place where the
power of the Buck decision became patently apparent was in Kansas.
In State v. Schaffer,221 the State asked the court to compel a surgeon at
Topeka State Hospital to perform sterilizations required by state
law.222 Unlike most cases where a prisoner contested his own
sterilization, this case was about a doctor exercising his right not to
perform a surgery with which he had a moral disagreement.223 This
distinction suggests that dissent existed in the medical community.
Relying on Buck’s assertion that sterilization was a matter of
public health, the Schaffer court framed the issue of individual liberty
not as it related to the state’s police power, but as the state’s choice
between promoting reproduction and promoting survival:
Reducing this problem of reconciliation of personal liberty and
governmental restraint to its lowest biological terms, the two
functions indispensable to the continued existence of human
life are nutrition and reproduction. Without nutrition, the
individual dies; without reproduction, the race dies. Procreation
of defective and feeble-minded children with criminal
tendencies does not advantage, but patently disadvantages, the
race. Reproduction turns adversary and thwarts the ultimate
end and purpose of reproduction. The race may insure its own
perpetuation and such progeny may be prevented in the
interest of the higher general welfare.224
For the Kansas Supreme Court, the question was not about the extent
to which the state can infringe on an individual’s liberty. The question
was about the state’s own balancing decisions and the “health” of the
race as a whole, removing the individual’s liberty interest from the
discussion.
Thus, by the time the Idaho Supreme Court was deciding the
constitutionality of sterilization three years later, the equal protection
220. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 162 So. 123, 128 (Ala. 1935); Davis v.
Walton, 276 P. 921, 924 (Utah 1929).
221. 270 P. 604 (Kan. 1928).
222. Id. at 604.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 605.
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question had become almost routine. In State v. Troutman,225 the
Idaho Supreme Court quickly eliminated each constitutional
objection to the state sterilization statute.226 The Troutman court
noted that an individual liberty interest may not even exist for the
feeble-minded.227 And similarly, in In re Main,228 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma simply noted that Oklahoma’s law was substantively
identical to the Virginia law in Buck, and that the interest of the
public good overcame any liberty interest an individual might have.229
In sum, in the ten years following Buck, state courts expanded upon
the notion that legislation could treat institutionalized and noninstitutionalized citizens differently to encompass the idea that
institutionalized people may not even have a right to reproduction in
the first place.
Despite the fact that Buck’s holding upheld sterilization on equal
protection and due process grounds, its language also led state courts
to reject arguments that sterilization constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.230 For instance, in 1931 the Nebraska Supreme Court
used this precedent to dismiss a cruel and unusual punishment
argument.231 The court explained that a vasectomy was a relatively
minor operation because it is a relatively short procedure that is not
dangerous to the individual’s health and does not remove the
individual’s sexual desire or ability to engage in sexual activity.232
Coupling Buck’s finding that sterilization is inherently not penal with
the simplicity of the operation, the Nebraska court was able to avoid
the cruel and unusual punishment argument altogether. Once the
gentleness of the operation had been cast in this light, the Nebraska
court could avoid questions about the infringement of individual
liberty and easily liken the operation to immunizations.233
225. 299 P. 668 (Idaho 1931).
226. Id. at 669–71.
227. Id. at 670 (“If there be any natural right for natively mental defectives to beget
children, that right must give way to the police power of the state in protecting the
common welfare, so far as it can be protected, against this hereditary type of feeblemindedness.”).
228. 19 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1933).
229. Id. at 154–56 (“[Even] assuming that the right to beget children is a natural and
constitutional right . . . this right cannot be extended beyond the common welfare.”).
230. See Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516, 519 (Va. 1925) (“The act is not a penal statute. The
purpose of the Legislature was not to punish but to protect the class of socially inadequate
citizens named therein from themselves, and to promote the welfare of society by
mitigating race degeneracy and raising the average standard of intelligence of the people
of the state.”).
231. In re Clayton, 234 N.W. 630, 632 (Neb. 1931).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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Ten years later (and fifteen years after Buck), the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma used a similar logic to justify upholding the state’s
sterilization statute in Skinner.234 In Oklahoma, the sterilization law at
issue only applied to convicted criminals, making the contention that
the law was not “penal” more problematic. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma recognized that it had a choice: construe the statute as
penal, and therefore unconstitutional, or construe the statute as the
promotion of public health akin to vaccinations, and therefore
valid.235 The court decided to “assume” the legislative intent was to
prevent procreation of people who would then become criminals in
order to avoid invalidating the law.236 It was Buck that gave courts the
ability to circumvent the difficult issues raised by forcibly removing
an individual’s ability to have children.
B.

Imposing Procedure on Eugenics Programs

The first state to take a stand against sterilization laws on
procedural grounds was Utah in 1929. In Davis v. Walton,237 the Utah
Supreme Court held that the state failed to show that Davis was “the
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise
afflicted,” as required by law.238 A prison guard alleged he had caught
the inmate committing sodomy with another inmate, although the
other inmate denied this allegation.239 On its face, the finding is simply
an application of basic principles—the State did not prove the
elements required for the sterilization statute to attach. But the court
stepped further in criticizing the State. The court noted that the
operation would not help the inmate overcome his “abnormal sexual
desire.”240 Furthermore, the sterilization order did not specify which
of the three operation types was ordered (vasectomy, cutting the
nerves, or castration), and so the cruelty of the act could not be
assessed.241 The Utah court critiqued the practice of sterilization by
discussing the potential cruelty of the operation itself and the
retributive nature of the State’s decision to sterilize a homosexual,
who had no chance of procreating with another man anyway.242

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

State ex rel. Williamson, 115 P.2d 123, 126 (Okla. 1941).
Id.
Id. at 127.
276 P. 921 (Utah 1929).
Id. at 922.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 924–25.
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In 1935, the Supreme Court of Alabama also found procedural
problems with its state sterilization statute.243 In contrast to other
cases, this case was a certified question from the governor, implying
that the Governor took issue with the legislative enactment in the first
place, and thereby making the court’s position politically easier.244
The court first distinguished the Alabama law from the Virginia law
upheld in Buck by pointing out that the Alabama legislation denied a
right to appeal de novo in a court.245 The Supreme Court of Alabama
then set out several procedural problems with the legislation related
to the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard.246 In making its
procedural due process argument, the court articulated why process
was so important, thereby hinting at the substantive issue:
We think that the sterilization of a person is such an injury to
the person as is contemplated by the quoted provision—just as
much so as to deprive him of any other faculty, sense, or limb—
and that due process of law means that this cannot be done
without a hearing on notice before a duly constituted tribunal
or board, and, if this is not a court, then with the untrammeled
right of appeal to a court for a judicial review from the finding
of the board or commission adjudging him a fit subject for
sterilization.247
Even with this articulation of the importance of the right to have
children, the Supreme Court of Alabama provided guidance to the
legislature for creating a valid sterilization statute. Sterilization is an
appropriate use of the police power so long as (1) status
determination is constitutionally ascertained, and (2) the procedure is
not cruel and unusual punishment.248
And then, over fifteen years after Buck, the Washington
Supreme Court in In re Hendrickson,249 struck down another
sterilization statute on procedural grounds in 1942, only months
before the Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma’s sterilization law
in Skinner.250 The Washington court challenged the way the state
provided notice to confined people facing sterilization.251 The law
243. In re Opinion of the Justices, 162 So. 123, 128 (Ala. 1935).
244. See id. at 124.
245. Id. at 128.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 123 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1942).
250. Id. at 357 (decided on March 5, 1942); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942) (decided on June 1, 1942).
251. In re Hendrickson, 123 P.2d. at 325–26.
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required that the state simply give notice to the feeble-minded
person, which the court contested because by definition that person
would not likely understand the procedure against him.252 The law
provided notice to the insane differently than the feeble-minded: the
state was to provide notice to the guardian, or the next of kin, but if
neither of those existed, to the superintendent of the facility.253 The
court took issue with this latter provision as well, because the
superintendent of the facility was the same person who would be
recommending the sterilization.254
The Hendrickson court’s desire to strike down the sterilization
statute was apparent, because neither of these procedural provisions
applied to Hendrickson himself, since notice was provided to
Hendrickson’s next of kin—in this case, his father.255 The Washington
court twisted itself around to strike down the whole of the statute,
holding that because the law was primarily designed to limit
procreation by the feeble-minded, the provisions applying to the
insane like Hendrickson would not have been enacted without the
unconstitutional provision for the feeble-minded.256 As the dissent
pointed out, the court’s reasoning is somewhat unjustified because if
the legislature had known that parts of the law inapplicable to a
person at bar were unconstitutional, those portions would have been
omitted in the first place.257
In sum, process became the framework through which courts
could discuss the importance of the right infringed upon by
sterilization laws. Courts used these procedural constraints to keep
the eugenics movement in check in some states. But this reliance on
process to invalidate eugenics laws led to an increase in process—
increased procedure resulted in a mechanized, normalized process for

252. Id.; Act of Mar. 8, 1921, ch. 53, sec. 4, 1921 Wash. Sess. Laws 162, 164
(“prevent[ing] the procreation of feeble minded, insane, epileptic, habitual criminals,
moral degenerates, and sexual perverts, who may be inmates of institutions maintained by
the state”), invalidated by In re Hendrickson, 123 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1942).
253. In re Hendrickson, 123 P.2d at 325; Act of Mar. 8, 1921, ch. 53, sec. 4, 1921 Wash.
Sess. Laws at164.
254. In re Hendrickson, 123 P.2d at 326 (“Such a situation is contrary to the spirit of
our laws and institutions. It is beyond the capacity of human nature for one individual to
act fairly, in practical effect, as jailer, prosecutor, judge, and executioner and, at the same
time, as guardian or next friend of the insane accused. The statute places a superintendent
in an impossible position however fair minded and conscientious he may be. As a practical
matter, it does not afford the inmate the kind of notice and opportunity to appear and
defend guaranteed by the due process clause.”).
255. Id. at 324.
256. Id. at 327.
257. Id. at 328 (Steinert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016)

1912

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

sterilizing people. The North Carolina experience exemplifies how
the judicial focus on heightened procedure worked to embed a
routinized eugenics program in the state, with little room for victims
to question what was happening to them.258 Despite the
mechanization of the sterilization process, courts at least attempted to
protect the rights of plaintiffs by heightening procedural
requirements. In other areas of the legal profession, especially with
some practicing lawyers and academics, questions about the legality
and morality of sterilization emerged. The law was on the side of
sterilization, but rumbles of dissent were growing.
IV. THE REJECTION OF STERILIZATION, 1930S–1942
A. Gauging Lawyers’ Attitudes Towards Eugenics in the 1930s
There were other voices calling for reason, too. Clarence Ruddy,
a member of the class of 1927 at Notre Dame Law School and the
first editor-in-chief of the Notre Dame Lawyer (what became the
Notre Dame Law Review)259 provided probably the strongest case
against sterilization in a law review during the entire decade of the
1920s.260 Ruddy framed the issue of sterilization as one of many
infringements on individual freedom and constitutional rights and
stated that “[t]he most dramatic means so far adopted for the
extinction of the individual is sterilization.”261 He based his case
against sterilization largely on religious doctrine that taught the
dignity of humans and the limitations that the state could impose on
religion.262 It was a passionate plea, but one that was not heeded. A
year earlier, a young, radical lawyer from New York City, Jacob
Broches Aronoff, wrote in the St. John’s Law Review about the
reasons for public opposition to eugenics legislation.263 Born in 1896
in Russia, Aronoff was a 1918 graduate of Columbia College, where

258. See infra Section V.B. (discussing North Carolina’s sterilization regime).
259. See Clarence J. Ruddy, Birth of the Notre Dame Lawyer,52 NOTRE DAME LAW.
589, 589 (1977) (discussing the founding of the Notre Dame Lawyer); History, Notre Dame
Law Review, http://ndlawreview.org/about/history/ [http://perma.cc/VD2X-5C5U] (noting
the name change took place in 1981).
260. See generally Clarence J. Ruddy, Note, Compulsory Sterilization: An
Unwarranted Extension of the Powers of Government, 3 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1927)
(making the fundamental argument that the government should not have the power to
sterilize any citizen).
261. Id. at 2.
262. Id. at 15–16.
263. Jacob Broches Aronoff, The Constitutionality of Asexualization Legislation in the
United States, 1 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 146, 146–47 (1926).
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he was a member of the Intercollegiate Socialist Club, and a 1923
graduate of Fordham University School of Law.264 In the early 1930s,
Aronoff supported union workers with several articles in the popular
press,265 in addition to his work as a lawyer.266 From his standpoint,
the system “look[ed] like a heartless method on the part of the taxpaying classes of getting rid of a duty of caring for the helpless and
unfortunate of the poorer strata of society . . . .”267 Despite those
vigorous protests against sterilization, the tendency was going in the
other direction.
Perhaps one of the most pernicious aspects of Buck v. Bell was
its legitimation of sterilization. The year 1930 saw discussion of yet
another book endorsing eugenics based on both its potential to
preserve and improve the white race, E.S. Gosney and Paul
Popenoe’s Sterilization for Human Betterment.268 It discussed
California’s supposed success with sterilization.269 Gosney and
Popenoe’s handbook included an address by Otis H. Castle at the
ABA’s annual meeting in 1928.270 Castle, a Los Angeles lawyer,271 was
also a board member of the Human Betterment League272 and
sometimes a lecturer at the University of Southern California’s
School of Law.273
One underutilized method of gauging the legal profession’s
attitudes towards sterilization involves reading their literary output.274
To that end, several prominent legal commentators lent their support
to the eugenics movement as advanced by Gosney and Popenoe.
264. Email from Frank Aronoff to Alfred Brophy, Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C.
Sch. of Law (May 13, 2016, 2:38 AM EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
265. See, e.g., Sterling D. Spero & Jacob Broches Aronoff, War in the Kentucky
Mountains, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 1932, at 226–33; Sterling D. Spero & Jacob Broches
Aronoff, A Business Men’s Strike, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1932, at 262.
266. Email from Frank Aronoff to Alfred Brophy, supra note 264 (mentioning that
Jacob Aronoff worked as a lawyer for Simplicity Patterns).
267. Aronoff, supra note 263, at 147.
268. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
269. GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra note 48, at xiii–xiv.
270. Otis H. Castle, The Law and Human Sterilization, in GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra
note 48, at 156–77.
271. Otis. H. Castle, Legal Phases of Co-Operative Buildings, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 n.*
(1928).
272. GOSNEY & POPENOE, supra note 48, at 194 (listing board members of the Human
Betterment League).
273. Castle, supra note 271, at 1 n.*.
274. See Alfred Brophy, Gauging Attitudes from Law Reviews: The Case of
Sterilization, FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/03
/gauging-public-attitudes-from-law-reviews-the-case-of-sterilization.html [https://perma.cc
/PV3N-WTMU] (reviewing various law review articles and book reviews regarding
eugenics).
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William Renwick Riddell, a judge on the Ontario, Canada, appellate
bench and a prolific historian,275 reviewed Sterilization for Human
Betterment in the ABA Journal in 1930.276 He invoked Buck and then
added that “the appalling prevalence of imbecility and the consequent
drain upon the resources of the people have impelled many to
consider sterilization of the imbecile as called for . . . .”277 Riddell
concluded, “other jurisdictions may well profit by the example of
California.”278 Similarly, University of Illinois Sociology Professor
Donald Taft’s review of Sterilization for Human Betterment in the
Illinois Law Review concluded, “[s]terilization will eliminate many
socially dangerous homes. If, as is quite probable, a race somewhat
sounder eugenically also results, we can all rejoice.”279
Even though courts routinely upheld sterilization legislation in
the 1930s, others in the legal profession expressed reservations about
such legislation. Law review articles in the 1930s reveal lawyers’
skepticism of eugenics.280 The Yale Law Journal offered a mild
critique in its review of Gosney and Popenoe, asking for a more
extensive review of the scientific evidence in support of
sterilization.281 The Harvard Law Review’s even shorter review of
Sterilization for Human Betterment concluded by noting that the
imminence of eugenic legislation was “disturbing.”282 While these
were not strong criticisms by any means, they demonstrated concern
about what was coming.
Further, some law review articles advanced an alternative vision
with stronger skepticism towards this movement. Such skepticism
appeared in reviews of City University of New York Professor Jacob
Henry Landman’s 1932 book Human Sterilization.283 Landman was
275. See William Renwick Riddell, CANADIAN ENCYLCOPEDIA, (June 13, 2016, 12:43
AM), http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/william-renwick-riddell/ [https://
perma.cc/RS4E-2GKY].
276. William Renwick Riddell, Book Review, 16 A.B.A. J. 253, 253 (1930).
277. Id. at 253.
278. Id.
279. Donald R. Taft, Book Review, 24 ILL. L. REV. 944, 947 (1930).
280. See id. at 946 (reviewing authors who were skeptical of sterilization).
281. Arthur B. Dayton, Book Review, 39 YALE L.J. 596, 597 (1930) (stating his desire
“for an open, fact-finding mind on the whole problem of heredity, birth control, and
sterilization as applied to eugenics”).
282. Book Review, 43 HARV. L. REV. 160, 161–62 (1929) (reviewing GOSNEY &
POPENOE, supra note 48).
283. J. H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION: THE HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL
STERILIZATION MOVEMENT 4 (1932) [hereinafter LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION].
For instance, Landman referred to the “alarmist eugenics.” Id. He also discussed legal
problems with sterilization—and some ways to overcome them. Id. at 269–84. Landman
identified that public opinion was in favor of eugenics. See id. at 120. These observations
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cautious about sterilization and his reviewers frequently extended his
criticisms. For example, George S. Roche’s review in the California
Law Review argued that Landman failed to engage fully with the
moral qualms about sterilization.284 Roche, whose other work
presented a sympathetic case for temporary housing for itinerant
workers in California,285 wrote that “the author does not always
recognize the Devil in disguise.”286 Another review of Landman that
appeared in the Southern California Law Review, written by a law
student, ridiculed the underlying justification for sterilization by
drawing attention to the logical extreme of the eugenics movement:
the outright extermination of the “unfit.”287
Despite some important critiques of eugenics in law reviews,
other articles supported sterilization. In addition to the early articles
by Aubrey Stode and Burke Shartel that supported sterilization
before Buck v. Bell, law reviews supported sterilization into the 1930s.
During the 1934–1935 school year, the Kentucky Law Journal
published two pieces supporting sterilization. The first was a student
work.288 The second was an article by University of Kentucky
Anthropology Professor and Dean of the graduate school W.D.
Funkhouser.289 Dean Funkhouser concluded his article:
added to Landman’s earlier article. See J. H. Landman, The History of Human
Sterilization in the United States—Theory, Statute, Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463, 464,
466 (1929) [hereinafter Landman, The History of Human Sterilization in the United States]
(noting that eugenics was considered by the Court after “decades of active propaganda”
and that eugenics enthusiasts’ “inexcusable error” came by confusing causation with
correlation).
284. George S. Roche, Book Review, 22 CAL. L. REV. 129, 130 (1933).
285. George S. Roche, California’s Labor Camps For Itinerant Unemployed, 22 NAT’L
MUN. REV. 133, 133 (1933).
286. Roche, supra note 284, at 130. Several other reviews critiqued Landman in other
ways to suggest that sterilization was overused. See Sidney S. Grant, Book Review, 12
B.U. L. REV. 749, 750 (1932) (recognizing the potential value of eugenics but expressing
concerns about its administration); LeRoy M. A. Maeder, Book Review, 81 U. PENN. L.
REV. 653, 654 (1932) (arguing that Landman’s dissatisfaction with psychological and
psychiatric classifications for feebleminded people compels overly simplistic definitive
classifications).
287. Ernestine Tinsley, Book Note, 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 353 (1932). In this unusual
review, the author of the review, law student Ernestine Tinsley, first mockingly quoted
Nietzche’s famous line “[b]ehold, I teach you the superman,” before going on to make the
more outrageous suggestion that the “unfit” be exterminated. Id. at 351 (quoting F.
NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 13 (Boni & Liveright eds., Thomas Common
trans. 1917) (1883)).
288. George T. Skinner, Note, A Sterilization Statute for Kentucky, 23 KY. L.J. 168, 168
(1934) (noting that the best way to reduce society’s “misery resulting from insanity” is
through a “harmless surgical operation, namely sterilization”).
289. W.D. Funkhouser, Eugenical Sterilization, 23 KY. L.J. 511, 516 (1935). Though
Funkhouser cites 1899 as the first legal adoption of sterilization, 1899 refers to the date
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In those states where consistent and regular use of the measure
has been followed, since it was first legally adopted in 1899, the
results are startling even after one generation. No new patients
are appearing to fill the slowly decreasing ranks in the asylums
and hospitals except those who come from other states. This
decrease will of course be greater with each succeeding
generation. In fact it is claimed that if sterilization laws could be
enforced in the whole United States, less than four generations
would eliminate nine-tenths of the feeble-mindedness, insanity
and crime of the country.290
Even though some lawyers and students took to the pages of law
reviews to ridicule eugenics or make the case against it, public
attitudes—as reflected in legislation—continued to favor sterilization.
Sterilization legislation swept through state legislatures in the 1920s
and 1930s.291 LeRoy Maeder’s review of Landman’s book in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review begins with the recognition of
the popularity of sterilization:
The voluminous literature on human sterilization which has
appeared in recent years has been for the most part definitely
biased in favor of this procedure and has served to influence a
considerable group of people to believe that in the general
employment of this method as a compulsory eugenic measure
will bring about a substantial reduction in the number of the
socially inadequate, especially the feebleminded. The
enthusiasts have succeeded so well in their propaganda that
even sober-minded persons have urged the adoption of broad
human sterilization legislation as a means of coping with the
mentally disordered and deficient, and of reducing the burden
of state appropriations to public institutions supporting them.292
This survey of law reviews demonstrates that even as the state courts
were falling in line behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v.
Bell, there was some opposition to eugenics in the legal community.
That is, legal scholars at the time understood that sterilization
when sterilizations commenced in Indiana. Id. at 516. The first law supporting sterilization
was in 1907. ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS
OF BETTER BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA 5, 99 (2d ed. 2016); Eugenic Sterilization in
Indiana, 38 IND. L.J. 275, 276 (1963).
290. Funkhouser, supra note 289, at 516. A brief review of Landman in the Idaho Law
Journal was to the same effect. Book Review, 3 IDAHO L.J. 103, 105 (1933) (reviewing
LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION, supra note 283 and noting the “satisfactory” results
of sterilization and its minimal impact on patients’ lives).
291. See, e.g., F.C.N., supra note 96, at 617 (reviewing states’ adoption of sterilization
statutes).
292. Maeder, supra note 286, at 653.
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implicated significant moral problems, the economic justification for
it being one of the most significant. However, from Buck v. Bell
through the late 1930s, the weight of public opinion and legal
authority remained in favor of sterilization.293
B.

Skinner v. Oklahoma: Recognizing a Fundamental Right

Fifteen years after Buck in 1942, the Supreme Court struck down
a sterilization law in Skinner v. Oklahoma.294 Skinner is remembered
for its importance in the larger movement towards fundamental rights
and the expansion of substantive due process in the 1950s and
1960s.295 The case represents a culmination of previous efforts to
highlight the fundamental rights of procreation and outlines a
distinction between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.296 But
within the context of the eugenics movement, it is important to
remember that Skinner carved out a way for Buck v. Bell to continue
to govern many state sterilization programs.
The Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma sterilization statute
violated the equal protection clause because it exempted certain
criminal activity from compulsory sterilization.297 The Oklahoma law
required that people who had been convicted of more than two
felonies were to be sterilized if doing so would not injure the
individual.298 Exempt felonies included embezzlement, but not theft.
So, Skinner, who had stolen chickens and committed armed robbery
twice, would be sterilized, but a person who stole funds from his
company (essentially the same act) would not.299 In drawing this
distinction, the court elaborated on the heightened scrutiny that the
equal protection clause requires for laws that infringe on a
fundamental right.300
However, the Supreme Court specifically noted that it was not
overturning Buck, thereby allowing many state sterilization statutes
to remain intact after Skinner.301 Buck had a “saving feature” that

293. See Brophy, supra note 274; COHEN, supra note 3, at 2–6.
294. 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).
295. NOURSE, supra note 13, at 15–16.
296. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42; see NOURSE, supra note 13, at 164–65 (discussing
competing interpretations of Skinner).
297. Id. at 541.
298. Id. at 541–42.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 540.
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Skinner did not: it treated all institutionalized people the same.302
Following sterilization under Buck, institutionalized people might be
permitted to reside in their community.303 That is, if the legislature’s
classification was between institutionalized and non-institutionalized
feeble-minded people, and sterilization would allow more people to
avoid institutionalization, then the equal protection clause was
satisfied.304 On the other hand, the statute in Skinner treated some
felons differently from others.305 It sterilized those convicted three
times of grand larceny while it did not sterilize those convicted three
times of embezzlement.306 For that reason, states could continue to
sterilize the feeble-minded and insane without running into major
equal protection hurdles.
With the Supreme Court’s validation of sterilization in Buck, the
question of whether sterilization violated fundamental rights would
have to await the development of the substantive due process
doctrine. The judiciary had wavered on recognizing a fundamental
human right to have children. But as the law developed, procedural
focus gave way to a cost-benefit calculation—one that ultimately
subordinated these potential rights to the interests of the state. In this
sense, the legal justification for sterilization was rooted in the interest
of the government.
As often is the case in American law, the march towards liberty
was accompanied by an expansion in the value we attached to
individuals.307 Whereas before World War II, eugenicists emphasized
the costs to society and minimized the interests of the people who had
children; after the war, that rhetoric was more circumscribed and an
understanding of the value of autonomy over reproductive decisions
ultimately emerged. However, in spite of these changing social and
legal norms, state-sponsored sterilization programs persisted in
several parts of the country, including North Carolina.308 Against this

302. Id. at 541 (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race . . . . Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable
injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”).
303. Id. at 541–42.
304. Id. at 540–41.
305. Id. at 541–42.
306. Id.
307. See Carl Brent Swisher, The Delineation of Personal and Civil Rights, 44 GEO.
L.J. 395, 396 (1956) (noting the newfound emphasis on individual rights within the
Supreme Court).
308. See Begos, supra note 28 (noting persistence and expansion of sterilization
program in North Carolina following World War II).
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backdrop, we now turn to an analysis of North Carolina’s experience
with sterilization.
V. THE NORTH CAROLINA MINDSET
All three branches of state government weighed in on North
Carolina’s eugenics program. The original non-criminal sterilization
law, which the legislature passed in 1929, was revised after the courts
raised concerns about whether it afforded individuals adequate
procedural protections.309 The new law, passed in 1933, did have
procedural safeguards, which the executive branch then used to
develop a systematic practice for identifying candidates for
sterilization.310 Although the use of sterilization began to wane in the
1960s, the legislature revised the law in 1974 and it faced another
court challenge.311 Even in the wake of Roe v. Wade and the
revolution of reproductive rights, however, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina upheld sterilization in 1976—and the legacy of this
long-lasting state-sponsored program continues to cast a dark shadow
over both the individuals affected and the state’s jurisprudence.312
A. The 1929 Sterilization Law and the Court’s Procedural Objections
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted its first
sterilization statute in 1919, authorizing sterilizations for the health
and well-being of prison inmates.313 In 1929, two years after Buck v.
Bell, North Carolina passed its first sterilization statute that applied
outside the prison context.314 The statute provided that:
It shall be the duty of the board of commissioners of any county
of North Carolina, at the public cost and expense, to have the
operation performed upon any mentally defective or feebleminded resident of the county, not an inmate of any public
institution, upon the petition and request of the next kin or
legal guardian of such mentally defective person . . . .315
309. Act of Feb. 18, 1929, ch. 34, sec. 2, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 28, 28 (1929), invalidated
by Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); see infra Section V.A.
310. Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (repealed 2003); see infra
Section V.B.
311. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 458, 458–461 (repealed
2003); see infra Section V.C.
312. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 96, 104–05, 221 S.E.2d at 313; see infra Section V.D.
313. Act of Mar. 11, 1919, ch. 281, sec. 1–2, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 504, 504 (1919)
(repealed 1929).
314. Act of Feb. 18, 1929, ch. 34, sec. 2, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 28, 28 (1929), invalidated
by Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
315. Id.
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina struck down the law for lack of
procedural due process in Brewer v. Valk, since Buck had specifically
emphasized the importance of both notice and a hearing.316 The
court’s holding turned explicitly on the need for notice and hearing in
matters that involve right to be free from physical harm.317
Despite the court’s recognition of human rights involved in
involuntary sterilization, Brewer focused on the benefits of
sterilization, both to society and to the individual.318 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina took Buck one-step further by lauding the
benefits of sterilization for the individual. Instead of focusing on the
savings eugenics offers for the state, as Buck did, Brewer portrayed
the state as helping a poor woman stop herself from having more
children.319 In Brewer, the Supreme Court of North Carolina gave
clear directions on how to fix the sterilization statute, while at the
same time recognizing that a procedurally compliant eugenics
program would have social benefits.320 The legislature needed only to
provide notice and opportunity to be heard, paralleling the provisions
of the statute in neighboring Virginia, and the revision would be
upheld. Process, not whether or not the individual had a fundamental
right to have children, became the focus of the legislature in
redrafting the law and the executive branch in administering the law.
B.

The Revised 1933 Sterilization Act

The revised 1933 North Carolina Act provided some
additional—but not many—procedural protections for those who
would be sterilized, grounding the justification in what it claimed was
the best interest of the patient or the public good.321 For those who
were institutionalized, the proceedings before the Eugenics Board
were initiated by written petition of the “prosecutor,”322 who was
generally the superintendent of any “penal or charitable” institution
supported by the state.323 The petition needed to contain the medical
history of the person to be sterilized and particular reasons why
316. Brewer, 204 N.C. at 190–91, 167 S.E. at 640.
317. Id. at 191, 176 S.E. at 640.
318. Id. (“In property rights due process requires a forum with notice and a hearing. It
goes without saying that the same must apply to human rights. If the Constitution and laws
in relation to due process-notice and hearing which undoubtedly apply to a material thing,
they should more so apply to the human element.”).
319. Id. (emphasizing the burdens of Appellant Mary Brewer in having children).
320. Id.
321. Act of April 5, 1933, ch. 224, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (1933) (repealed 2003).
322. Id. sec. 4, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 346.
323. Id. sec. 1, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 345.
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sterilization was recommended.324 A physician who had actual
knowledge of the case then verified the medical history, and a social
history of the patient’s life was included in the petition in order to
predict the likelihood of the patient to procreate.325 A copy of the
petition was then served, along with written notice to the patient or
the patient’s guardian, stating when the board would hear the
petition.326 The Eugenics Board would then make its decision, and if it
determined that sterilization was for “the best interest for the mental,
moral or physical improvement of the patient” or “for the public
good[,]” then the board was required to approve the
recommendation.327
1. The 1935 Sterilization Pamphlet
Two years after the Act’s passage, the Eugenics Board published
a pamphlet, Eugenical Sterilizations in North Carolina, that served
partly as a propaganda piece and partly as a how-to manual for those
seeking to obtain the Eugenics Board’s approval for their patients.328
The pamphlet began in the same way that Gosney and Popenoe’s
Sterilization for Human Betterment did—by noting that in modern
society many people who survive to reach childbearing age would
have died in earlier generations.329 That is, sterilization was justified
on the premise that it served the supposed purpose that nature once
did—making sure that the unfit did not have children.330 The parallels
of the two works reflect the intellectual colonization of North
Carolina by Gosney and Popenoe’s arguments.
The pamphlet quotes a Raleigh News and Observer editorial
supporting sterilization,331 as well as the State Board of Public
Health’s study of the “Wake family,” which discussed a married
couple from Wake County.332 The pamphlet also provided summary
tables on the number of people sterilized through June 1935, breaking
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. sec. 8, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 347.
Id.
Id. sec. 9, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 348.
Id. sec. 4, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 346.
See generally BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION, supra note 43 (providing an overview of the North Carolina sterilization
law and statistics on sterilization in the state).
329. Id. at 5.
330. Id. (“Under Nature’s law we bred principally from the top. Today we breed from
the top, the middle and the bottom, but more rapidly from the bottom.” (quoting GOSNEY
& POPENOE, supra note 48, at v)).
331. Id. at 5–6.
332. Id. at 10–11; see supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text (discussing the study of
the “Wake family”).
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down the data into various categories, such as gender, race, age, and
whether those sterilized were in state or county institutions or resided
in the community.333 A table also detailed common types of illnesses
of those who were sterilized.334 The pamphlet’s tables—which were
periodically updated in biennial reports of the Eugenics Board—
reveal that once the Eugenics Board heard a petition, the request was
almost always approved. From the passage of the 1933 Act until June
1935, the Board considered 236 petitions, of which it approved 231.335
It is unclear how many, if any, of the five rejected petitions involved
“consent.” Of the 231 petitions approved, there was one appeal. In
that one case, the superior court upheld the Eugenics Board’s
decision.336 By the end of June 1935, 223 operations had been carried
out (including several dozen that were approved under the 1929
law).337 Of those, 155 had been for people in either state (140) or
county institutions (15); the other 68 resided in the community.338
The 1935 pamphlet also reprinted several forms for facilitating
approval from the Eugenics Board. The first was a petition for
individuals in a state or county institution.339 The petition recited that
sterilization was in the best interest of the patient and that
sterilization was for the public good; and that the inmate would “be
likely, unless operated upon, to procreate a child or children who
would have a tendency to serious physical, mental or nervous disease
or deficiency.”340 The petition collected information on the individual,
personal and family history, and their medical history. 341 The forms
asked for the individual’s “record of defects.” 342 The list provided a
number of possible “defects”, including (in this order): insanity,
feeble-mindedness,
epilepsy,
convulsions,
paralysis,
sexual
333. BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION,
supra note 43, at app. A, 16–20.
334. Id. at app. A, 19 tbl. VII.
335. Id. at app. A, 16 tbl. I.
336. Id. The majority, 179, were women; only 42 men were sterilized. Id. Of those in
state institutions, again the majority, 103, were women; only 37 men were sterilized. Id. at
app A, 16 tbl. II. Of those outside of institutions, the majority, 63, were women; only 5
men were sterilized. Id. at app. A, 17 tbl III. With regard to race, there are some
noticeable differences in the types of operations that African American and white men
had. Of the 28 African American men who were sterilized, the method for 20 of those was
listed as “castration.” Id. at app. A, 18 tbl. IV. Of the 16 white men, 6 were castrated and
all of the others had vasectomies. Id. at app. A, 20 tbl. IX.
337. Id. at app. A, 16 tbl. II.
338. Id.
339. Id. at app. B, 28 (form 1).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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promiscuity, syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis, alcoholism, criminality,
suicidal tendency, pauper, drug addict, congenital blindness, acquired
blindness, acquired deafness, dumbness, extreme nervousness, chorea
(sudenhams), and chorea (Huntingtons).343 Another briefer form was
used for patients in the community,344 and another form provided for
next of kin to consent.345 Already, two years after the passage of
North Carolina’s sterilization law, the administrative state was well
prepared to smooth the way to sterilization of hundreds of North
Carolinians, mostly women, each year.
2. The Administration of Sterilization in North Carolina
Two administrative manuals helped explain to state officials how
to proceed with sterilization petitions before the Eugenics Board. The
1948 Administrative Manual was the first one that the state
produced.346 The manual contained a brief history of the North
Carolina movement for sterilization, noting in particular that North
Carolina was influenced by California’s experience.347 The 1948
manual also provided, perhaps unsurprisingly, a roadmap to the
sterilization process. This guidance described first who may be
sterilized (the “feebleminded, epileptic, and mentally diseased”) and
then described the circumstances in which those people may be
sterilized. 348 Sterilization was possible in three instances: (1) when it is
believed that such an operation would be for “the best interests of the
individual concerned”; (2) “for the public good”; or (3) “when it is
believed a child or children might be born who would have a
tendency to serious mental or nervous disease or deficiency.”349
The manual then identified those with responsibility and power
to file sterilization petitions: the executive head of a penal or
charitable organizations and the county superintendent of public
welfare.350 The manual also provided instructions regarding the forms
343. Id.
344. Id. at app. B, 30–31 (form 2).
345. Id. at app. B, 33 (form 6a).
346. See Alfred Brophy, The Administrative Law of Sterilization, FAC. LOUNGE (Apr.
23, 2012), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/04/the-administrative-law-of-sterilization
.html [https://perma.cc/LKG3-DMKB]. See generally THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C.,
MANUAL, EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA (1948), http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm4
/document.php?CISOROOT=/p249901coll22&CISOPTR=417440&REC=2 [https://perma
.cc/QW2T-RSBH].
347. THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., supra note 346, at 7.
348. Id. at 9.
349. Id.; see also Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 4(1)–4(3), 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345,
345–46 (repealed 2003).
350. THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., supra note 346, at 9–10.
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to use.351 The forms differed based on whether the person to be
sterilized was institutionalized or resident in the community.352 The
manual instructed that the petition for sterilization should provide
information regarding the “likelihood of the person to procreate a
child or children who would have a tendency to serious physical,
mental, or nervous disease or deficiency, and . . . [t]he reasons why it
is considered to be for the public good that the individual have the
operation.”353
Perhaps tellingly, the manual’s instructions do not ask for specific
evidence of why sterilization was in the best interest of the individual,
even though the sterilization statute provided that the best interest of
the individual was one reason that could support a sterilization.354
This omission suggests that the emphasis of the Eugenics Board was
shifting to procreation and to public good, signaling that the board
was no longer so focused on the supposed benefits to the individual to
be sterilized.
Finally, the manual turned to the critical issue of consent,
explaining that the Eugenics Board was more likely to approve a
procedure if either the individual or an authorized family member
consented.355 It provided a form for individuals who were competent
to consent (at least twenty-one years of age, not confined in one of
the four state mental hospitals, nor mentally unsound).356 Others
needed the consent of a spouse, parent, next of kin, or guardian.357 If
the person to be sterilized was married, then the spouse’s consent was
recommended.358 If the spouse could not be located, then the next of
kin could suffice.359 If the person to be sterilized was a minor, consent
of a parent—preferably the father—was needed, or a guardian ad
litem if there was no parent.360 In those cases where consent had not
been obtained, the Eugenics Board was required to hold a hearing “in
which reasons for and against the operation [were] heard.”361

351. Id. at 10–11.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 12.
354. Id.; see also Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 4(1), 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 346
(repealed 2003).
355. THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., supra note 346, at 12–14.
356. Id. at 12–13, 31–32 (form 6-B).
357. Id. at 13, 30–31 (form 6-A).
358. Id. at 13.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 13–14.
361. Id. at 15–16 (discussing procedure for notice of hearing when “when necessary
consents are not secured”).

94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016)

2016]

EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C.

1925

The 1948 manual’s outline of procedures, particularly around
consent, leads naturally to several questions concerning the procedure
for securing “consent.” Maybe the most important is how did state
actors secure consent? What proportion of petitions had consent?
How often did the board reject petitions where there was consent?
What evidence did the board require where there was no consent? In
what proportion of contested cases did they reject contested
petitions? And what can we discover about the nature of the board’s
deliberations? In short, how did the board operate? These
foundational questions regarding the meaning of “consent” and how
the state behaved when it was depriving its citizens of the right to
procreation are difficult to answer given the limited and aggregate
data that the Eugenics Board released.362 The data does not indicate
how the practices varied depending on the race, gender, and age of
the sterilization targets.363
We desperately need a better picture of how the process worked
from the view of petitioners—the hospitals and the county
superintendents of public welfare. That picture should address how
the petitioners selected people to suggest for sterilization. We need to
know much more as well about the mysterious process by which
individuals and their families were convinced to agree to sterilization.
Finally, we need to know more about how the state reacted in the
instances in which the individuals and families would not agree to
sterilization.
Moya Woodside’s 1950 book, Sterilization in North Carolina: A
Sociological and Psychological Study, alludes to the mechanics of this
coercive process.364 In spite of being published well after sterilization
was on the decline, her book represented an attempt to sustain the
eugenics movement. The epigram for the book, for instance, was
taken from famed North Carolina political scientist Howard Odum:
“In the modern world of technology the folkways are supplanted
362. See infra Section V.B.3 (discussing aggregate data that is available in the
Eugenics Board’s biennial reports). See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 16 BIENNIAL
REPORT: JULY 1, 1964 TO JUNE 30, 1966 (1966), [hereinafter 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT]
http://archives.hsl.unc.edu/nchh/nchh-08/nchh-08-016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ77-E5ZL]
(providing aggregated race, gender, and age data in the Eugenics Board’s 1966 biennial
report).
363. See 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 25–26, tbls. 16 & 17.
364. MOYA WOODSIDE, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: A SOCIOLOGICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 19 (1950) (“The law appears to have a compulsory
character, since it is made the duty of institution or welfare superintendents to bring
forward suitable cases for sterilization; and sworn consent is not required from the
individual if he or she is a minor or inmate of a State mental institution. In practice this
compulsory power is rarely exercised.”).
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largely by the technicways. If change can be brought about, it can best
be done by understanding the folkways and substituting the
technicways for them.”365 That is, Woodside seems to support a
substitution of the “folkways” of all citizens having children for the
“technicways” of eugenics.
Yet, Woodside realized the challenges sterilization faced and
thus included a chapter that addressed “[d]ifficulties [i]mpeding
[w]ider [a]cceptance.”366 This inclusion was a final call in defense of
eugenics, about a decade after sterilization had been rejected
elsewhere in the United States and as others were regularly rejecting
sterilization. She provides a picture of how the process worked in
practice, in conjunction with North Carolina’s code.
The sterilization process in North Carolina began with a petition
from the head of an institution or a county welfare official or a
petition from a family member attesting that sterilization was in the
best interest of society.367 If there was consent from the individual or a
family member, then authorization by the board seemed to be easy.
In most instances, apparently, there was consent by either the
individual or a family member. Woodside reported that all but ten of
the 276 petitions filed with the Eugenics Board between 1944 and
1946 included consent forms.368 In fact, many of the people involved
in the process complained about the procedural hurdles to
sterilization. That is, health officials at the center of petitioning the
Eugenics Board found the procedures burdensome and difficult to
meet unless there was consent by the individual or a family
member.369
These statements leave significant questions about what process
was used to obtain consent from individuals or family members.
Woodside gives some sense of how consent was obtained by
discussing what she called “education.”370 However, her examples
reveal that there was often substantial opposition to sterilization by
family members.371 What remains unknown are the number of people
sterilized with consent of a family member and the number sterilized
365. Id. at xiii (quoting HOWARD W. ODUM, UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY 225 (1947)).
366. Id. at 60 (“Chapter 5: Difficulties Impeding Wider Acceptance of Sterilization”).
See generally id. at 69–74 (discussing legal and procedural difficulties associated with
sterilization procedures).
367. See id. at 10–12 (describing the procedure required to petition for a sterilization
procedure).
368. Id. at 13.
369. Id. at 70–71.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 91.
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with their own consent. Most importantly, it still remains unknown
what “consent” means or how it was obtained. Answers to these
questions would tell us a great deal about the course of sterilization in
North Carolina. We can infer that “consent” was coerced in many
cases.372 However, the leading historian in this area has estimated that
twenty percent of the consensual sterilizations were voluntarily
sought by patients as part of a normal family planning process.373
One other gauge of the Eugenics Board’s interpretation of
“consent” comes from the administrative manuals they produced.374
As already noted, the 1948 manual provided forms and advice to state
officials who prepared petitions to sterilize individuals. 375 Even as late
as 1948, the manual presented a positive case for sterilization.376 For
instance, the manual stated that sterilization “permits patients, who
would otherwise be confined to institutions during the fertile period
of life, to return to their homes and friends.”377 The 1960 manual
backed off the 1948 manual’s statements about positive aspects of
eugenics, instead acknowledging that the effects of sterilization are
“physical as well as emotional and that there will be both positive and
negative factors to consider.”378 This later manual presented
sterilization as “part of a broad system of protection and supervision
of those individuals unable to meet their responsibilities as parents
and citizens.”379 And the 1960 manual emphasized the participation of
those who were sterilized and their families, as well as health care
providers.380 In essence, the 1960 manual established a more nuanced
and co-operative vision for sterilization.
372. Woodside, for instance, writes that the overwhelming number of petitions
presented to the Eugenics Board in the two years leading up to June 1946 (266 of 276
petitions presented) had “consents.” Id. at 13. However, she acknowledged that this was
perhaps the result of “careful selection and interpretation.” Id. Although she wrote of the
importance of preserving individual liberty, she acknowledged that “theoretical concepts
of individual liberty are often remote from the sort of practical situation in which
sterilization is usually proposed.” Id. at 24. Woodside devoted a chapter to discussing the
stiff resistance in the community to sterilization and how hard state welfare had to work to
get patients to agree to sterilization, which further suggests the amount of “coercion” that
was involved. See id. at 60–95.
373. SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 113.
374. See Brophy, supra note 346.
375. See supra notes 355–361 and accompanying text.
376. See THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., supra note 346, at 7 (presenting positive view of
sterilization and stating that it “carries no stigma or humiliation”).
377. Id. at 8.
378. THE EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., MANUAL: THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH
CAROLINA, sec. 10 (1960), http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=
/p249901coll22&CISOPTR=417492&REC=3 [https://perma.cc/SHG7-MD9U].
379. Id.
380. Id.
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This change in language invites several interpretations. In some
ways, it shifted the focus to the people sterilized and away from the
benefits of sterilization for the state. On the other hand, the language
of the 1960 manual made a gross violation of personal autonomy
seem like something in the best interest of the person sterilized. The
later manual framed the issue from the perspective of the person to
be sterilized. “The law” provides, the manual noted, “for the
sterilization of individuals . . . when such individuals are found to be in
need of the protection of sterilization from the standpoint of their
social, emotional, mental and physical development and related
environmental factors.”381 By 1960, the focus of the state’s regulation
of procreation had shifted from the good of the state to the supposed
good of the patient.
The 1960 manual also provided more guidance than the 1948
manual on the meaning of “consent.” Among other things, the
revised manual mandated that the individual’s “spouse, parents,
and/or next of kin have participated in the casework plan leading to
the decision for sterilization.”382 And, along with this new focus, it
added a new form to provide more guidance on a person’s “social
history” to “giv[e] an explanation as to why sterilization seems to be
indicated.”383
The changes within the revised manual correlated with changing
numbers of people sterilized, too. The next Section turns to the data
provided in the biennial reports of the Eugenics Board to trace out
the nature of changes in sterilization, from the gender, race, and age
of those sterilized to the changes in the proportion of people in
institutional settings who were sterilized. By analyzing the aggregate
data released by the Eugenics Board from the 1930s to the 1960s, this
Article endeavors to provide broad answers to the questions about
consent in the operation of North Carolina’s eugenics regime.
3. North Carolina’s Data: “Compulsion and Consent”384
The role of consent is central to understanding the nature and
scope of North Carolina’s sterilization program, but many important
questions remain unanswered. There are some summary figures,
381. Id. at sec. 30.
382. Id. at sec. 50. The manual provides that “the individual for whom sterilization is
being considered, the spouse, parents, and/or next of kin have participated in the casework
plan leading to the decision for sterilization.” Id.
383. Id. at sec. 40; Id. at sec. 50 (“Form No. 7 – Supplement to Form no. 1. Petition for
Sterilization – Social Information”).
384. WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 19.
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however, from which some inferences can be drawn. The Eugenics
Board’s 1966 annual report set forth historical figures on the number
of people sterilized each year from 1929 through 1966.385 The data is
broken down between patients who were institutionalized and
patients who were based in the community, as indicated in Table 1.386
Surprisingly, the height of sterilization in North Carolina was in the
1950s, well after most other jurisdictions’ eugenics programs had
begun to decline.387 In fact, the Eugenics Board seems to have been
quite proactive in the decade after World War II ended. The
publication of the 1948 administrative manual coincided with the
increase in sterilizations.388 Perhaps that administrative manual, by
making clearer the procedures to be used, was instrumental in the
Eugenics Board’s increased effectiveness.389
The biennial reports of the Eugenics Board reveal that only a
small percentage of people were sterilized over the objection of their
family members, especially after 1936.390 Table 2 lists the percentage
of petitions received by the Eugenics Board in two-year segments
from 1934 to 1966 for which there was no consent by the individual or
family members.391 After the first biennial report (1934–1936), when
the Eugenics Board was apparently still working out strategies for
effectively finding and approving people for sterilization, the petitions
almost always had the consent of family members.392 From 1936 to
1954, there were never more than 6.5% of the petitions in any
biennial period that lacked consent.393 As the 1944 biennial report
observed, “if the case for sterilization is properly presented, the
cooperation of the family can be secured in most instances.”394 From
1956 onward, the biennial reports list no cases where there was no
“consent.”395 Apparently there were very few, if any, such cases.396
385. 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 26.
386. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
387. See infra Appendix, Table 1 & 4.
388. See infra Appendix, Table 1 & 4.
389. See, e.g., ELSIE PARKER, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 8 BIENNIAL REPORT: JULY 1,
1948 TO JUNE 30, 1950, at 10 (1950) [hereinafter 1950 BIENNIAL REPORT], https://archive
.org/details/biennialreporteug08nort [https://perma.cc/P7DV-4B3J] (touting the increase in
sterilizations over the previous biennial period).
390. See WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 13 (“Few petitions are presented without
consents attached.”).
391. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
392. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
393. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
394. R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 6 BIENNIAL REPORT: JULY 1, 1942
TO JUNE 30, 1944, at 8 (1944) [hereinafter 1944 BIENNIAL REPORT], https://archive.org
/details/biennialreporteug05nort [https://perma.cc/DZ5L-2KDA].
395. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
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Similarly, the 1960 biennial report noted the usual cooperation:
“[T]he individual and husband, or wife, or close relative usually
participate in the plan and make their own decision in favor of the
operation before signing the consent.”397 In the few instances when
family consent was not obtained, the Eugenics Board still seems to
have moved forward. For instance, in the 1948–1950 period, 81% of
the petitions filed without family consent were still approved.398
There was at least nominal “consent” for the vast majority of
sterilizations approved by the Eugenics Board. What remains
unclear—and will almost surely remain unclear until there is a
systematic study of records that are not yet open to the public—is
how much of the purported “consent” was actually coerced. The
biennial reports frequently reference the difficulty of obtaining
consent from men. The 1948–1950 biennial report, for instance,
reported, “[m]en need much interpretation to assure them that the
operation is simple and that its only effect is the prevention of
parenthood.”399 As shown in Table 4, the dramatic decline in the
percentage of men who were sterilized, particularly after the mid1950s, may reflect the difficulty of coercing men or the relative ease of
coercing women.400
Moreover, the distinction between the treatment of people from
the community as opposed to those who were institutionalized merits
significant attention. A review of the administrative process indicates
that those based in the community could only have been sterilized
through consent—though here, again, what consent meant and how
much coercion was involved in obtaining “consent” is difficult, if not
396. Or, if there were any such cases, the state may have been more inclined to report
non-consensual sterilizations because of the growing social stigma attached to the practice.
397. EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 13 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF
NORTH CAROLINA, JULY 1, 1958 TO JUNE 30, 1960, at 7 (1960) [hereinafter 1960
BIENNIAL REPORT], https://archive.org/details/biennialreporteug13nort [https://perma.cc
/XK37-R6RJ].
398. 1950 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 389, at 13.
399. Id. at 11.
400. See infra Appendix, Table 4. The Eugenics Board often noted its efforts to secure
compliance in their biennial reports. For instance, the Board prepared a report in the early
1950s regarding children of people who were subsequently sterilized. The study suggested
that the children were disproportionately developmentally disabled. 1950 BIENNIAL
REPORT, supra note 393, at 9 (discussing on-going study); ETHEL SPEAS, EUGENICS BD.
OF N.C., 9 BIENNIAL REPORT: JULY 1, 1950 TO JUNE 30, 1952, at 8–10 (1952) [hereinafter
1952 BIENNIAL REPORT], https://ia800208.us.archive.org/2/items/biennialreporteug09nort
/biennialreporteug09nort.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7ZM-27WJ] (discussing results of the
study, which was published in North Carolina State Board of Public Welfare’s Public
Welfare News (March 1952)). Such studies, thus, might provide further support for the
Board’s efforts to encourage sterilization.
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impossible, to determine at this point. Thus, while the number of
institutionalized people sterilized remained in the hundreds through
the middle of the 1950s, by the 1960s more than eighty percent of
people sterilized resided in the community.401
When social workers did extract consent, the Eugenics Board did
not hold a hearing.402 The Board only conducted hearings in cases
where neither the patient herself nor the patients’ next of kin
consented. 403 The Eugenics Board approved the vast majority of
petitions in the early years, but by the 1960s, was routinely rejecting
petitions.404 For instance, while from 1934 to 1936, the Board
authorized 301 of the 309 petitions presented, from 1964 to 1966, it
authorized only 368 of the 461 petitions presented.405
Some hint of just how much planning was involved on the part of
public health officials to obtain “consent” of family members to
sterilization appears in Moya Woodside’s book, Sterilization in North
Carolina.406 Woodside described the ideas and practices of social
workers as they tried to convince North Carolinians to accept
sterilization.407 Woodside detailed the opposition that state welfare
workers faced when encouraging sterilization.408 She noted that
individuals undergoing sterilization procedures and their family
members often proved quite obstinate.409 For instance, she reported
that “[o]ne of the Negro gynecologists, accustomed to talk with
husbands for permission to operate on their wives, said he thought an
important factor in refusal was the pride a man had in his ability to
make his wife pregnant.”410 Sometimes the social workers’ discussion
of opposition to sterilization was infused with racial prejudice. For
401. See 1952 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 400, at 8. In the early 1950s, the
Eugenics Board pushed the sterilization of people in institutions, which accounts for the
jump in sterilizations of the institutionalized. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
402. See BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION, supra note 43, at 14.
403. See id.
404. 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 25, tbl. 11; see infra Appendix, Table
2.
405. 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 25, tbl. 11; see infra Appendix, Table
3.
406. WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 164–67 (noting the need for “education” and
outlining different lines of “[p]ropaganda” to promote sterilization).
407. See id. at 94–95, 164–67; see also Mary Ziegler, Reinventing Eugenics:
Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After World War II, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
319, 323 (2008).
408. WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 94–95 (summarizing the perceived challenges to
obtaining consent and acceptance of sterilization).
409. Id. at 61–62.
410. Id. at 68.
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instance, one welfare worker wrote that “the Negroes tend to resist
more than the whites which may be due to ignorance and superstition
which is more prevalent among the Negroes than the whites.”411
Woodside herself wrote about the opposition in rural North Carolina
more broadly, stating that “[a]mong such backward and isolated
groups as we have described, no great response can be expected to
proposals of a scientific nature which run counter to folkways and
experience.”412
Woodside’s description of petitions before the Eugenics Board
reveals that individuals may have been subject to coercion or worse.
While some patients provided consent themselves, many others had
consent forms signed by family members.413 For instance, one twentythree-year-old man who already had one child and was described as a
“borderline mental defective” consented, along with his wife, to his
sterilization.414 A single, twenty-five-year-old African American
woman who had a fifth grade education and who was described as
“sexually promiscuous” and “physically and mentally incapable of
protecting herself” signed her consent form, along with her sister.415 A
seventeen-year-old African American girl who was in the Samarcand
institution and had an I.Q. of fifty-eight had her consent form signed
by her grandmother.416 Those cases, perhaps representative, suggest
that even when there was consent by an individual, that individual
may not have had an adequate understanding of their actions. In
other cases, the consent was extracted from family members who may
themselves have been subject to coercion.417
411. Id. at 85.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 16–18.
414. Id. at 17.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. As part of North Carolina’s office of Justice for Sterilization Victims Foundation,
a few redacted petitions were released, which illustrate the kinds of family and personal
histories that were used to justify sterilization. These petitions reflect how little
background the Eugenics Board members had available to them when deciding on a
petition. See, e.g., R. Eugene Brown, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., Form No. 1. Petition for
Operation of Sterilization or Asexualization. Inmate of State or County Institution, in
BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION, supra note
43, at 28 app. B. As part of the contemporary movement for compensation, a number of
stories about the nature of “consent” have come to light as well. See, e.g., Kevin Begos &
John Railey, Sign This or Else: A Young Woman Made a Hard Choice, and Life Has Not
Been Peaceful Since, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 9, 2002, 1:27 PM), http://www.journalnow
.com/news/local/sign-this-or-else/article_3e865b26-8c03-11e2-b819-001a4bcf6878.html [https:
//perma.cc/3F8Q-F35W]; Kevin Begos, Sterilization Was Often the Way Out: State
Hospitals, Training Schools Had Captive Population, but Staffers and Social Workers Were
Sometimes at Odds, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 9, 2002, 1:09 PM), http://www.journalnow
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The 1974 Revisions and the Role of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina

In the early 1970s, North Carolina continued its retreat from
sterilization. In 1974 the North Carolina legislature transferred
jurisdiction over compulsory sterilization to the state courts.418 The
statute transferred authority to hear the case to the North Carolina
courts, but maintained the familiar grounds for authorization from
the 1933 legislation.419 When considering a petition for involuntary
sterilization, the court could approve the procedure if one of the
following criteria was met: (1) the sterilization was deemed to be in
the best interest of the individual or the public good, (2) the
individual would be likely to have a child with a serious disability or
the individual could not care for a child, or (3) the next of kin or
guardian had requested the procedure.420 Thus, the law continued to
authorize involuntary sterilization when in the best interest of the
state.
The new legislation led to a challenge that made its way up to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1976 in In re Sterilization of
Moore.421 The case arose from a petition filed by the Forsythe County
Department of Social Services requesting sterilization of a minor
child, Joseph Lee Moore, who had an IQ of forty.422 The justification
for the procedure was that the child, if not sterilized, would likely
have children with serious disabilities.423 Although the Forsyth
County Superior Court held the statute to be unconstitutional,424 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the law.425 In an odd
juxtaposition of citations, the court cited Roe v. Wade and Buck v.
Bell in the same sentence.426 But instead of focusing on Roe’s finding
.com/news/local/sterilization-was-often-the-way-out/article_97931328-8fee-11e2-bf880019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/9LJF-HYE8]; John Railey, ‘It Ain’t Fair’: Old IQ
Score Helped Social Workers Get Reluctant Teen-ager Sterilized, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec.
9, 2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/it-ain-t-fair/article_811cc5328fec-11e2-92a5-0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/E5QC-5XGL].
418. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, sec. 1, §§ 35–37, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 458, 458
(repealed 2003).
419. These grounds track section 4 of North Carolina’s 1933 legislation. See Act of
Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 4, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 346 (repealed 2003).
420. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, sec. 1, § 35-39, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 458, 459
(repealed 2003).
421. 289 N.C. 96, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
422. Id. at 96, 221 S.E.2d at 308–09.
423. Id. at 104–05, 221 S.E.2d at 313.
424. Id. at 109, 221 S.E.2d at 316.
425. Id. at 104–05, 221 S.E.2d at 313.
426. Id. at 102, 221 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)).
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of a right to control one’s own reproductive rights, the court focused
on Roe’s finding of a limitation on the right to control one’s own
reproductive rights after the first trimester. Thus, the court focused
on Roe’s acknowledgement of the state’s interest in regulating
reproduction.427
Amazingly, the court then went on to state that the “welfare of
all citizens should take precedence over the rights of individuals to
procreate.”428 Thus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina read Roe’s
concession that the state could limit the right of choice after the first
trimester in conjunction with Buck to limit the reproductive freedom
of a developmentally disabled child. In language reminiscent of the
eugenics literature of the 1910s and 1920s, the court stated: “It is the
function of the Legislature, and its duty as well, to enact appropriate
legislation to protect the public and preserve the race from the known
effects of the procreation of mentally deficient children by the
mentally deficient . . . .”429 The In re Moore opinion also distinguished
the North Carolina statute from the one struck down in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, because the law applied equally to all developmentally
disabled persons without distinction.430
Recognizing the “duty” of the legislature to “preserve the race”
through the enactment of sterilization laws, the court validated not
only the North Carolina sterilization law, but also the eugenics
movement as a whole.431 In re Moore has never been expressly
overturned, though whether it would survive constitutional muster
today is questionable.432 It was against this backdrop, with the most
427. Id. at 102–03, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
428. Id. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
429. Id. (quoting In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Neb. 1968)).
430. Id. at 105, 221 S.E.2d at 313–14.
431. Id. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312; see DAREN BAKST, North Carolina’s ForcedSterilization Program: A Case for Compensating the Living Victims, JOHN LOCKE FOUND.
16 (2011), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/policyReports/NCeugenics.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PRJ2-LA8W]. Shortly after the decision in In re Sterilization of Moore, a federal
district court largely upheld the sterilization statute in a constitutional challenge brought
by the North Carolina Association for Retarded Children and the United States as
intervener, but struck down the provision allowing the next of kin or guardian to request a
petition on the person’s behalf. N.C. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420
F. Supp. 451, 458–59 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (invalidating Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, sec. 1,
§ 35-39(4),1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 458, 459).
432. While both In re Moore and Buck have been cited as good law in the twenty-first
century, the cold economic calculations behind these decisions, as well their racial
underpinnings, have been roundly rejected by modern constitutional jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 427 (2007). But see Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253
F.3d 1124, 1229 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927))
(permitting state limitations on reproductive rights of developmentally disabled citizens,
but still permitting suit for violations of constitutional rights to go forward against state
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recent opinion of the state’s highest court having bucked the spirit of
Roe and staked out its support for the eugenics movement, that North
Carolinians began to uncover and reject this thinking.
D. The Legacy of Sterilization in North Carolina
As more people began to understand North Carolina’s eugenics
program, support grew for the notion that the State should apologize,
including in monetary terms, to those sterilized by the Eugenics
Board. One step on the road to pursuing compensation was taking
stock of just what the State had done, and on what scale, in the name
of economic expediency. North Carolina oversaw one of “the largest
and most aggressive sterilization programs” in the country.433
Between 1929 and 1974, nearly 7,600 men and women were sterilized
as a result of the program.434 Some of the sterilization victims included
boys and girls as young as ten years old.435 In part because of the
legacy of In re Moore, involuntary sterilizations continued as late as
1980.436 In fact, the statute permitting involuntary sterilizations
remained in effect in North Carolina until 2003.437
The sterilization program disproportionately affected certain
groups. Women accounted for nearly 85% of the sterilization
victims.438 As Table 4 reveals, over time, the percentage of women
sterilized increased.439 Although in 1934, as the sterilization
procedures were being worked out, men were disproportionately
sterilized (only 34.8% of the people sterilized that year were women),
and every year after that saw a substantially greater proportion of
actor who coerced developmentally disabled adult to undergo sterilization); Britt v. State,
363 N.C. 546, 551, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting)
(“Moreover, it is well settled that ‘[a]cting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of
its police power, may impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and constitutional
rights of its citizens.’ ” (quoting In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at
312)); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1985) (holding a law banning
such sterilizations to be unconstitutional for “den[ying] incompetent developmentally
disabled persons rights which are accorded all other persons in violation of state and
federal constitutional guarantees of privacy”); BAKST, supra note 431, at 16.
433. See Begos, supra note 28.
434. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 5; Begos, supra
note 28.
435. See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 7; Begos, supra
note 28.
436. See In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 652–54, 263 S.E.2d 805, 808–09 (1980)
(upholding the involuntary sterilization of a mildly mentally retarded and developmentally
disabled woman); BAKST, supra note 431, at 13.
437. Act of Apr. 10, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 11, 11–12.
438. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 7.
439. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
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women than men sterilized.440 By the 1960s, well over 90% of the
sterilizations were performed on women.441 Although white and
African American people (and a few Native Americans) were
sterilized with the approval of the Eugenics Board, African
Americans were disproportionately sterilized in much of the period
after World War II.442 In fact, in every biennial report from 1946–1948
to 1964–1966, the percentage of African Americans sterilized
increased, from under 20% between 1946–1948 to nearly two-thirds
between 1964–1966.443 That the program became more focused on
race in the era of the Civil Rights movement also invites further
investigation.444 Also, some evidence suggests that race was very much
on the minds of the state welfare officers charged with implementing
North Carolina’s eugenics program.445 The percentage of African
American sterilized certainly increased over the period from 1946–
1948, when fewer than 20% of the people sterilized were African
American, to 1964–1966, when African Americans accounted for 64%
of those sterilized.
VI. THE CASE FOR REPARATIONS AND LIMITING PRINCIPLES
A. The North Carolina Reparations Program
For nearly a decade after Governor Easley’s public apology in
2002, some advocates in North Carolina quietly pursued
compensation for those who had been sterilized.446 Then, in 2011,
Governor Beverly Purdue established a “Governor’s Task Force to
Determine the Method of Compensation for Victims of North

440. See infra Appendix, Table 4
441. See infra Appendix, Table 4
442. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
443. See infra Appendix, Table 4
444. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
445. See, e.g., WOODSIDE, supra note 364, at 83–88 (discussing attitudes towards
African Americans by county health department workers and those workers’ assessment
of African Americans). While Woodside herself at several points disclaimed her belief
that race (as opposed to level of education) was a significant variable, id. at 83, at other
points she focuses on what she identifies as the different moral standards regarding family
and sex in the African American and white communities—the former of which she implies
lie at least partly in the era of slavery. Id. at 83–84. Thus, when she wrote that “[n]or are
number of children a matter for concern since this type of Negro, lacking incentive and
opportunity for achievement of a higher standard of living, rarely envisages long-term
goals and is content to live from day to day, taking whatever comes,” id. at 83–84, it is easy
to see her assessment of race as central to her assessment of the people she discusses.
446. Jon Ostendorff, Eugenics Victims Closer to Payout, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES,
May 23, 2012, at A1, A6.
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Carolina’s Eugenics.”447 The Governor’s Task Force recommended
that each then-living person who was sterilized receive $50,000.448 The
estates of those who had already passed away would receive nothing
under this plan. While one might think that the victims would have no
children, a significant number of people who were sterilized
conceived children before they were sterilized.449
In 2012, supporters of compensation introduced a bill, to be
funded with $10,000,000, to provide each “qualified recipient” with
$50,000.450 A “qualified recipient” was defined broadly as: “[a]n
individual who was asexualized or sterilized under the authority of
the Eugenics Board in accordance with Chapter 224 of the Public
Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937, and who was
living on May 16, 2012.”451 So anyone—regardless of the
circumstances—who was sterilized by order of the Eugenics Board
and survived until May 2012 would be entitled to compensation.
However, the nature of the sterilizations that took place in North
Carolina varied widely, from people who were sterilized involuntarily
outside of the Eugenics Board,452 to people who were sterilized with
the permission of their families,453 to people who themselves sought
out sterilization as a method of family planning.454 One scholar
447. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
448. Id. at 11.
449. Id. at 1. While the number of sterilization victims who had children before
sterilization is unknown, the North Carolina Governor’s Task Force discussed whether
victims’ children should receive compensation. See id. at 1.
450. H.R. 947, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012).
451. Id. sec. 1, § 143B-426.50(4). The bill excluded compensation as available assets for
determination of eligibility for government assistance programs. Id. sec. 1, § 143B426.56(a). The bill also provided for redacted records of the Eugenics Board for public
inspection. Id. sec. 4, § 132-1.23.
452. See, e.g., Rose Hoban, Eugenics Compensation Amendment Continues to Leave
Some Victims Out, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews
.org/2015/05/29/eugenics-compensation-amendment-continues-to-leave-some-victims-out/
[http://perma.cc/C93Y-Z5BQ] (discussing people who claim to have been sterilized
outside of the Eugenics Board and, therefore, do not have documentation necessary to
receive compensation).
453. See Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, § 2, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (repealed 2003).
454. See, e.g., SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 119–22 (noting that some petitions to
Eugenics Board were for family planning and contraceptive purposes). Schoen goes on to
note that petitions for family planning increased dramatically around 1959 and continued
through at least 1964. Id. at 122. The 1933 legislation provided that sterilizations pursuant
to the Eugenics Board were performed at public expense. See Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224,
sec. 2, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 346 (repealed 2003). Thus, sterilizations pursuant to the
Eugenics Board could be voluntary—through petition by the individual seeking
sterilization—or compelled. Individuals could have their own physicians perform
sterilization without any involvement or approval from the Eugenics Board. Id. sec. 11,
1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 349–50.
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estimated that perhaps twenty percent of the sterilizations that took
place after 1960 fell into this latter category.455 The bill passed in the
North Carolina House of Representatives,456 but failed to pass the
Senate.457
In 2013, another bill was introduced in the North Carolina
General Assembly to provide payments to sterilization victims.458
There was a serious question as to whether anything had changed in
the North Carolina Senate. North Carolina State Senator Phil Berger
recalled of the 2012 debate that “[t]here was no ability to develop
consensus on one particular path forward.”459 And yet, somehow, the
North Carolina legislature found $10,000,000 for a public fund for
reparations to sterilization victims.460 However, the authorizing
statute has some important limitations; the established fund capped
liability at $10,000,000.461 As a result, no matter how many people are
ultimately able to satisfy the requirements for compensation, the
liability will never go above that amount. Thus, the more people who
are deemed eligible the smaller the payout to each claimant.
As enacted, the North Carolina reparations program defines
eligibility more narrowly than the 2012 bill to include only people
who were sterilized involuntarily and pursuant to state action by the
North Carolina’s Eugenics Board.462 These two key limiting principles

455. SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 121.
456. House Bill 947: Eugenics Compensation Program, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://
www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2011&BillID=S800 [https://
perma.cc/95NW-5FYR] (noting that the bill was engrossed on June 5, 2012, and sent to the
Senate on June 6, 2012).
457. See S. 800, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012); Senate Bill 800: Eugenics
Compensation Program, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/
BillLookUp.pl?Session=&BillID2011=S800 [https://perma.cc/B4D3-ESH2] (noting final
action on S.B. 800 was a referral to the Committee on Appropriations/Base Budget on
May 17, 2012).
458. S. 421, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).
459. Mark Binker, McCrory’s Budget: Picking Three Fights, WRAL (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.wral.com/mccrory-s-budget-picking-three-fights/12247453/ [https://perma.cc/EL74CT4A].
460. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143B-426.50 to 143B-426.57 (2015) (expired effective June
30, 2015 pursuant to Current Operations and Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013,
ch. 360, § 6.18(g), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1023 (2013), as amended by An Act to Make
Base Budget Appropriations for Current Operations of State Departments, Institutions,
and Agencies, and for Other Purposes, ch. 100, § 6.13(e), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 346
(2014)); Valerie Bauerlein, North Carolina to Compensate Sterilization Victims: State Sets
$10 Million Pool to Pay Subjects in Eugenics Program, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2013, 1:46
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578629943220881914
[https://perma.cc/KVH6-93KX].
461. §§ 143B-426.50 to 426.51.
462. § 143B-426.50(5).

94. N.C. L. REV. 1871 (2016)

2016]

EUGENICS MOVEMENT IN N.C.

1939

have proven to be important. First, people who were sterilized
involuntarily but outside of the authorization of the Eugenics Board
are left without recourse.
Second, only those who were sterilized “involuntarily” are
eligible—the definition of “involuntary” is critical. Some people
sought the Eugenics Board’s approval for family planning purposes
and they are, thus, ineligible. To help resolve the ambiguity in the
definition of “involuntary,” the North Carolina legislation establishes
that those who were minors or incompetent are presumed to have
been sterilized involuntarily and those who were both adults and
competent are presumed to have been sterilized voluntarily.463 In each
case, that presumption could be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence.464 However, it is entirely possible that a number of
competent adults were coerced into agreeing to sterilization.465
Unfortunately, proving coercion several decades after the fact will
undoubtedly be difficult, leaving those people without recourse. Thus,
one major flaw with the legislation is that it leaves many people who
were coerced into agreeing to sterilization or whose family members
authorized the sterilization without redress.466
There is one other important limiting principle: claimants must
have survived until June 30, 2013, to be eligible.467 That is, there had
to be a direct, living victim at the time the legislation was being
debated. The lack of a direct, living victim is a frequent complaint in
other reparations cases, such as those for slavery and often Jim
Crow.468 Indeed, the heirs of eugenics victims have recently brought a
legal challenge, arguing this distinction violates the equal protection
clause.469
463. § 143B-426.50(3)(a).
464. See id. § 143B-426.53(a) (noting all eligibility determinations must be made by a
preponderance of the evidence).
465. See supra Section V.B.3 (discussing question of coercion in context of “voluntary”
sterilization).
466. See Hoban, supra note 452.
467. § 143B-426.50(1) (providing that “[a]n individual must be alive on June 30, 2013,
in order to be a claimant”).
468. See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON 151–54 (2006)
(discussing problems with reparations when the immediate victims may no longer be alive
and raising questions about the right of descendants of immediate victims to reparations
payments).
469. See Sharon McCloskey, Heirs of Eugenics Victims Denied Compensation Take
Their Case to the Court of Appeals, N.C. POLICY WATCH: PROGRESSIVE PULSE (Nov. 12,
2015), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2015/11/12/heirs-of-eugenics-victims-denied-compensationtake-their-case-to-the-court-of-appeals/#sthash.a77Jq1WV.dpuf [https://perma.cc/66L2-HWM8].
The case was recently remanded to a three-judge panel on the Wake County Superior
Court for further review. See In re Hughes, No. COA15-699, 2016 WL 611548, at *6 (N.C.
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Despite these significant limiting principles, the program does
provide a precedent for further reparations in other states. This is
particularly true given that the North Carolina plan also presumes
that people who were minors or incompetent were sterilized
involuntarily.470 This presumption likely reflects reality and may
preference the cases that are most likely to be meritorious. The North
Carolina Industrial Commission decides whether someone is a
qualified recipient.471 However, out of nearly 800 claimants, only 220
people have been deemed qualified.472 At least fifty people are
appealing their rejection of their claims.473 The initial delays
associated with the payment of claims prompted the general assembly
to amend the law to facilitate payments to qualified individuals.474 To
date, two payments totaling $35,000 have been distributed to each of
the qualified victims under the program.475
Following the enactment of the legislation in 2013, there have
been efforts to address some of the perceived shortfalls of the
reparations program.476 In particular, there have been several
legislative efforts to provide reparations to the victims of involuntary

Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeals and remanding the claim to the
Industrial Commission for a transfer to the Wake County Superior Court for
consideration of the law’s constitutionality). The plaintiffs have appealed the decision
regarding the proper jurisdiction of such disputes to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Brent J. Ducharme, Victims File Brief in Appeal to NC Supreme Court, UNC CTR. FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS (July 19, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://blogs.law.unc.edu/civilrights/2016/07/19
/eugenics-victims-file-brief-in-appeal-to-nc-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/9L8B-3JCQ].
470. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-426.50(3)(a) (2015) (providing compensation for minors
who were sterilized, whether with or without consent of the parents). The Office for
Justice for Sterilization Victims was established within the Department of Administration
to assist victims in understanding their rights and applying for compensation. See id.
§ 143B-426.54.
471. Id. § 143B-426.53; see 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 10K.0100–10K.0500 (2016) (providing
rules and regulations for the administration of eugenics compensation).
472. Hoban, supra note 452; see Mary Cornatzer, First Checks Go Out to NC Eugenics
Victims, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 27, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news
/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article10109309.html [https://
perma.cc/TH7H-T8MN].
473. Hoban, supra note 452.
474. Id.
475. Craig Jarvis, Second Eugenics Payments Issued, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 2,
2015), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/underthe-dome/article42276687.html [https://perma.cc/6MG6-8KLP].
476. Michael Gordon, Closing the Loopholes on Sterilization, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Feb. 20, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/inside-courts
-blog/article61516837.html [https://perma.cc/D2SJ-JVHW] (discussing limitations of the
Act and legislative and judicial efforts to expand payments to sterilization victims).
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sterilizations at the local level.477 County officials have already voiced
their support for instituting local compensation plans for sterilization
victims.478 A bill currently pending before the General Assembly
would allow the state’s four largest counties to pass ordinances to
compensate victims of involuntary sterilization under the authority of
local eugenics boards.479 However, these ordinances would be subject
to several significant limitations under the current legislation. The
individual counties would be responsible for providing the
reparations funds and would be under no obligation to compensate
victims.480 In addition to requiring that claims must be made by
December 31, 2019, the bill also limits the definition of “qualified
recipient” to include only claimants who are alive to make a claim.481
While these legislative solutions are by no means perfect, they
represent another step in the right direction towards compensating
victims.
B.

Factors Favoring Legislative Reparations

One of the important results of the North Carolina legislation is
that it sets a precedent for other state legislators that are thinking
about some sort of repair for their own eugenics programs—and
potentially for other miscarriages of justice outside of the eugenics
context. There are several key limiting principles that appear in the
case of state-sponsored eugenics that are useful to identify. Those
factors may reassure legislatures contemplating reparations that there
are concrete and important distinguishing factors, so that they are not
opening up an unlimited set of claims in other cases. Moreover, those
factors may provide important guideposts in reviewing other

477. For example, a recent legislative proposal by Senator Jeff Jackson of Mecklenburg
County to amend the law would allow people who were involuntarily sterilized by county
governments to be considered “qualified recipients” and thus eligible for compensation
payments. However, it failed to pass the general assembly. S. 532, 2015 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); Hoban, supra note 452.
478. Colin Campbell & Ann Doss Helms, More NC Eugenics Victims Could Become
Eligible for Compensation, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 9, 2016, 6:56 PM), http://www
.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article82871452.html [https://
perma.cc/NE82-2HG3]. Mecklenburg County commissioners recently unanimously voted
to endorse a local compensation plan proposed by Senator Jeff Jackson that would
provide $50,000 for each victim with a total compensation capped at $300,000. Id.
479. S. 29, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2016); Campbell & Helms, supra note
478. Under the current version of the legislation, Wake, Mecklenburg, Forsyth, and
Guilford counties would be permitted to provide compensation to eugenics victims.
Campbell & Helms, supra note 478.
480. Campbell & Helms, supra note 478.
481. S. 29, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 153A-248.1(b) (N.C. 2016).
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reparations claims. Conversely, some of these factors may be too
limiting and subsequent legislatures may want to drop the limitations.
Four factors characterize reparations for sterilization from other
reparations claims and make reparations for sterilization victims
particularly compelling. First, the government was the bad actor
here;482 this is not a claim for the type of general societal
discrimination that is so suspect in modern law.483 Second, the harm is
extraordinary and of a greater magnitude than many other intrusions
on personal autonomy and liberty. There are few—if any—other
episodes in the United States in the twentieth century that involved
such widespread, intentional government action.484 Third, many
people at the time knew it was wrong and spoke against
sterilization.485 Fourth, direct living connections remain between the
harm and repair.486 Thus, there are some immediate, living
connections to the injustices imposed those many years ago.
Why, then, were monetary reparations successful in North
Carolina’s case when virtually no others were in the past several
decades? What is it about sterilization that allowed the North
Carolina legislature to garner substantial bipartisan support? For one,
the sterilization program was not geared towards one particular race,
though in practice, one race may have been more affected.487 Second,
482. See supra Section IV.A (discussing North Carolina legislation and the extensive
administrative apparatus set up to administer the program).
483. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations
for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 497, 530–31 (2003) (citing Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989)) (noting generalized societal discrimination is insufficient
to support race-conscious affirmative action).
484. Others that come to mind, such as the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II, have been the subject of compensation. See generally ERIC L. MULLER,
COLORS OF CONFINEMENT (2012) (discussing confinement during World War II); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims,
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477 (1998) (discussing Japanese American compensation and
comparing it to African American reparations claims).
485. See supra Section IV.A (discussing skepticism of sterilization in law journals in the
1920s and 1930s). One of the important points here is that some people at the time knew
sterilization was wrong, so this is not a question of reading twenty-first century morality
back onto the actions of people some decades ago. See Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas
Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. REV. 757, 760–61 (2009) (warning about the
perils of excusing past actions because there was a different sense of morality).
486. Those living connections were central to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. It
provided compensation to Japanese Americans interned during World War II but limited
compensation to those who surviving into the 1980s. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 4215(a), 4218(2) (2012) (limiting eligible individuals to people alive at the date of
passage of the Act).
487. Claims for reparations for the eras of slavery and segregation have met with
extraordinary opposition in the public and in legislatures. See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note
461, at 4–5 (discussing public opinion polls and opposition to race-based reparations).
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the class of people who would be able to seek reparation funds was
known to be relatively small. The number of estimated victims still
alive at the time the legislation was passed (and thus eligible for
compensation) was 1,500 to 2,000.488 Third, people across the political
spectrum saw the inhumanity of North Carolina’s eugenics history.
Perhaps most compelling is the fact that as far back as the 1930s, legal
scholars and others argued that involuntary sterilizations were
improper.489 The catalogue of legal history discussed above teaches us
that people at the time of North Carolina’s sterilization program
realized that it was wrong. Thus, we are not reading today’s
sensibilities back onto decisions made by legislators, administrators,
and judges in the 1930s.
The North Carolina compensation legislation also offered the
opportunity for people to criticize whatever group they found
responsible for this harm. In the case of some conservatives, this was
the liberal scientists who refused to appreciate religious ideas.490 In
the case of liberals, this was another episode of the state depriving
women of their reproductive autonomy.491 The 2013 legislation saw a
rare moment of unanimity across the political spectrum in terms of
outrage about the state’s actions, even if not a complete consensus on
the morality of paying reparations.
The recent passage of a similar statute to compensate the victims
of involuntary sterilization in Virginia suggests that North Carolina is
already serving as a model for states moving forward. On October 30,
2015, the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation to
compensate the victims of involuntary sterilizations.492 Largely
modeled after the North Carolina statute, the Virginia statute
provides “compensation to individuals who were involuntarily
sterilized pursuant to the Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act,” who

488. Jim Morrill, Victim Advocates Want to Close Eugenics Loophole, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article9262985.html [https://perma.cc/JYJ4-6D2U].
489. See supra Section IV.A (discussing opposition to sterilizations by law reviews).
490. See Maggie Gallagher, “The Human Betterment League,” NAT’L REV. (Dec. 12,
2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/285545/human-betterment-league
-maggie-gallagher [https://perma.cc/9GJF-TE2Y].
491. See Irin Carmon, For Eugenics Sterilization Victims, Belated Justice, MSNBC
(June 27, 2014, 9:43 PM) http://www.msnbc.com/all/eugenic-sterilization-victims-belatedjustice [https://perma.cc/E2DW-FXG7]
492. See Jenna Portnoy, Va. General Assembly Agrees to Compensate Eugenics
Victims, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/va-general-assembly-agrees-to-compensate-eugenics-victims/2015/02/27/b2b7b0ecbe9e-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html [https://perma.cc/6KX5-A76A].
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were alive as of February 1, 2015.493 Similar to the North Carolina
experience, the legislation attracted broad support from conservatives
and liberals alike, offering a rare moment of bipartisan consensus.494
However, the Virginia statute only provides the victims of involuntary
sterilizations with a lump sum of only $25,000, as opposed to
$50,000.495
Additional efforts at the federal and state level continue to
promote compensation for the victims of state-sponsored sterilization
programs. The enactment of these two reparations programs has led
to an outpouring of support for reparations programs within other
states.496 In Congress, there has been a rare bipartisan effort to ensure
that payments from current or future state eugenics compensation
programs are not considered in eligibility determinations for federal
benefits.497 If enacted, the federal legislation could help facilitate the
payment of state reparations payments without limiting the
recipient’s ability to qualify for federal aid programs.498 While these
developments bode well for the future of legislative reparations in
other states, time is quickly running out for many of the victims of
involuntary sterilizations across the country.499

493. 2015 Appropriations Act, ch. 665, § 1-93, item 307(T)(1), 2015 Va. Acts __, __,
(2015).
494. See Portnoy, supra note 492.
495. 2015 Appropriations Act, ch. 665, § 1-93, item 307(T)(4), 2015 Va. Acts __, __,
(2015).
496. See, e.g., Mark G. Bold, Editorial, It’s Time for California to Compensate Its
Forced-Sterilization Victims, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-bold-forced-sterilization-compensation-20150306-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/T283-84A9]; Paul A. Lombardo & Peter L. Hardin, Editorial, Compensate
Eugenic Sterilization Victims: Column, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2013, 6:03 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21/eugenics-north-carolina-column/
2662317/ [https://perma.cc/D6BH-GBRC].
497. See Mark Barrett, Tillis, McHenry File Bills to Help Eugenics Victims, USA
TODAY (July 16, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/elections/2015/07/16/thomtillis-patrick-mchenry-eugenics-north-carolina/30247131/ [https://perma.cc/TB2D-5EJ4].
498. The bipartisan legislation, known as the “Treatment of Certain Payments in
Eugenics Compensation Act,” provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, payments made under a State eugenics compensation program shall not be
considered as income or resources in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, any
Federal public benefit.” S. 1698, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015) (as passed by the Senate, Nov.
30, 2015). H.R. 2949, a companion bill to S. 1698, was included in a larger bill, H.R. 5210,
and recently passed the House on a voice vote. H.R. 5210, 114th Cong. § 5 (2d Sess. 2016);
Press Release, U.S. Congressman Patrick McHenry, McHenry Eugenics Compensation
Legislation Passes House (July 6, 2016), http://mchenry.house.gov/news/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID=398250#sthash.YJoASFTV.dpuf [https://perma.cc/ER6E-HLWP].
The legislation has now been referred to the Senate Finance Committee. H.R. 5210, 114th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
499. Hoban, supra note 452.
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Designing Future Eugenics Reparations

In considering reparations legislation elsewhere, states may look
to a number of factors in designing their programs. Understanding
how the state’s program functioned is of critical importance. In North
Carolina, pivotal questions remain about who was selected for
sterilization; how the administrative agency—the state Eugenics
Board—operated; and what was the demographic data of those who
were sterilized. Judging from the Eugenics Board Meeting minutes,500
the hearings were perfunctory and often no family members
challenged the petition for sterilization. And rather hauntingly—
though understandably—there were well-established administrative
procedures for sterilizations, including pre-printed sterilization
petitions for state officials to complete.501
Closely related are difficult questions related to the amount of
coercion (or conversely, consent—if any) involved in the
sterilizations. As the North Carolina Sterilization Task Force’s final
report acknowledges, there were varying levels of coercion involved
in North Carolina’s history.502 For many people the sterilization was
involuntary; for others there was coercion; and for some (perhaps as
many as twenty percent during the 1960s) the process was
“voluntary.”503 Apparently many women, especially in the 1960s,
sought state-supplied sterilization as a method of family planning.
How many of those ostensibly “voluntary” requests were coerced in
some way, or suggested to those requesting them by government
officials, or family members, is unclear.504 That information may never
be known. Undoubtedly, some of this state action resulted in some of
the most outrageous interferences with personal autonomy practiced
in the United States in the twentieth century.
Each state will struggle with the question of what the
compensation program ought to look like. What program would in
some measure be fair to people whose personal autonomy was so
deeply affected, so long ago? Obviously no amount of money can
compensate for some harms. Reparations programs necessarily
500. Eugenics Bd., Minutes of the October 25, 1950 Meeting 1–4 (Oct. 25, 1950), http://
www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/DCR_Presentation_Handout_B-Sample_Eugenics
_Board_Minutes-October1950.pdf [https://perma.cc/59GT-JW6D] (containing single-sentence
explanations for decisions regarding sterilization).
501. BROWN, PURPOSE, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 43, at 22–24; BROWN, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE GROWTH OF EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION, supra note 43, at 28–30.
502. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.
503. SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 113.
504. Id. (using the term “elective sterilization” to refer to a “voluntary sterilization”).
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require legislators to balance limited state funds against the desire to
meaningfully repair and assist those who were unjustifiably harmed
by the state in a very direct and continuing way. A common approach
has been to provide money only in those cases where there remains a
direct, living connection—only to those immediate victims who are
still alive.505 Moreover, practical considerations favor calculating a
single figure and giving that to every living victim, rather than trying
to calibrate harm between victims. The most prominent case of this is
the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided $20,000 to every
Japanese American interned during World War II who survived until
1988.506 This approach had some obvious and unfortunate
consequences, in that many people who had suffered internment—
and whose descendants had suffered from property loss—received
nothing.
Other states now have the opportunity to provide similar
compensation regimes. They will likely focus on still-living people and
seek evidence of coercion. Those two principles will limit—perhaps
too much—the class of claimants. For while the living connection has
been critical to the North Carolina sterilization compensation
regime—and to other reparations regimes, such as the compensation
to Japanese Americans interned during World War II507—the
requirement of survivorship acts as a barrier to recovery for those
whose fundamental rights were infringed upon by the state.
Moreover, the amount of coercion is difficult to prove so many years
later. Given how much effort the state spent to facilitate “consent,” as
well as the limited efforts the state made to protect those being
sterilized, it is reasonable to presume that victims and their families
were coerced. At any rate, any ambiguities should be at least resolved
in favor of those who were sterilized.
There is something else that did not appear in the North
Carolina act, but that would be very useful and positive: a
comprehensive study of just what happened. Many outstanding
questions regarding the administration of the sterilization program
can only be answered, if at all, by looking at records that are within
the Eugenics Board’s archives. Those records are kept hidden for the
legitimate privacy concerns of family members and the sterilization
505. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4215(a)(1), 4218(2) (2012); see
also Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814–15 (2006).
506. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 4215(a) (2012); see also Alfred L. Brophy,
Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814 (2006).
507. See BROPHY, supra note 468, at 44 (noting that only those who were interned
during World War II and survived until 1986 were eligible for compensation).
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victims themselves. Nevertheless, a state legislature can order and
fund a study of those records, so that in addition to compensating the
victims we can all know the full measure of what happened. Such a
study would help us understand how appeals to white supremacy and
“cost-benefit” analyses led to legislature-mandated, judiciaryapproved, and administratively routinized eugenics programs across
our nation in the twentieth century. We remain skeptical that such a
study would take place given its potential to threaten the integrity of
the state’s claim that it has settled and made amends for its decadeslong intrusion on personal autonomy in the name of the economic
efficiency.
What, then, should future legislative action designed to repair for
state-sponsored eugenics look like? We believe that legislatures
should establish fixed amounts for each individual who was sterilized
pursuant to state-sponsored eugenics programs. Those who sought
out sterilization as part of family planning could be excluded from
compensation, but there should at least be a rebuttable presumption
that individuals sterilized pursuant to the requests of state (or local
government officials) are eligible for compensation. Given the
extensive and disturbing history of government-encouraged
sterilization, the burden should be firmly on government actors to
show that sterilization was voluntary rather than coercive.
There are two particularly difficult questions about designing
reparations plans for other states that have emerged from North
Carolina’s experience. First, there is a question about people who
were sterilized outside of the actions of state actors. That is, there
seem to be instances of women who were sterilized outside of the
Eugenics Board and outside of the county authorities.508 This is an
issue of local physicians acting independently. Even determining the
number of cases like this is difficult, but some anecdotal evidence
suggests they happened.509 One might reasonably argue that the state
should pay for those cases on the theory that the state authorities
helped establish the environment in which this could happen.510 Such
an approach would expand the scope of compensation beyond the
boundary of “state action,” but would be consistent with full repair

508. Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Victims, But Many Won’t Qualify, NPR
(Oct. 31, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/10/31/360355784/
payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-qualify [https://perma.cc/2X4J-C8NQ].
509. Id.
510. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, sec. 11, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 349–50
(explicitly providing for individuals to have their own physicians perform sterilization).
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for the legal and political environment that told disabled individuals
their welfare was less important than the public treasury.
The second difficult issue that has emerged from North
Carolina’s experience is the question of whether compensation should
be limited to those who are still alive. That living connection was a
key limiting principle for the North Carolina legislation—and likely
made it possible to pass laws that otherwise might have had thousands
of claimants.511 However, that limiting principle also serves to
dramatically reduce the reparative scope of the program. There is
good reason to expand the program at least to immediate relatives of
those who were sterilized, such as surviving spouses and children.
Such an expansion would keep many of the values inherent in
requiring a living survivor because there are people quite closely
connected to the sterilized individual. It is likely those people suffered
some of—and in the case of surviving spouses the exact same—the
emotional pain as sterilized individual.
What remains to be done, in addition to compensation, is to
recover a full story of just how the sterilization programs operated, as
state legislatures struggle to assess and repair for some of the most
egregious interferences with personal autonomy in the twentiethcentury United States. This is a particularly difficult issue because the
legacy of eugenics casts a shadow over contemporary discussions of
reproductive freedom. Unsurprisingly, many in the African American
community in particular find the legacy of state-sponsored
sterilization a disturbing warning about the potential for state control
of reproductive rights.512 Thus, redress for the era of eugenics may be
necessary not just as a case of doing justice to individuals sterilized,
but also to regain legitimacy for the state going forward as it deals
with issues of reproductive freedom, particularly for women from
historically marginalized communities. In order to restore the
confidence and security among North Carolina women that their
reproductive rights will be protected in the future, the state must
demonstrate that it recognizes the past intrusions on reproductive
freedom were wrong and is committed to repairing the damage.513

511. See Carmon, supra note 491.
512. See, e.g., SCHOEN, supra note 14, at 70 (discussing skepticism in the African
American community about state-sponsored family planning).
513. See id. at 249–50.
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CONCLUSION
We have placed the North Carolina Eugenics program in the
context of the national movement for eugenics that grew in the early
twentieth century. The national movement emerged from a set of
factors, including the desire to respond to the cost of government care
for disabled individuals, a concern for public money over personal
autonomy, and a fear of the loss of white supremacy. Though the
movement initially faced opposition in the state courts, after the
United States Supreme Court’s 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell, state
courts and legislatures increasingly approved eugenics programs. The
North Carolina legislature established a Eugenics Board in 1933 to
approve state-provided sterilizations and the Board established an
elaborate administrative apparatus to process petitions from state
officials seeking permission to sterilize disable institutionalized
individuals, as well as North Carolinians living in the community. This
regime resulted in the sterilization of approximately 7,600 people.514
While most frequently the Board processed applications where the
individuals or their family members had “consented” to sterilization,
in a relatively small percentage of cases from the 1930s to the middle
of the 1950s, the Board approved sterilization even over the
objections of individuals and their families.
The attention that scholars and journalists brought to the legacy
of state-sponsored sterilization led to legislation providing
compensation to those who were still-living as of 2013 and could
demonstrate that they were sterilized pursuant to action by the state
Eugenic Board. While the legislation has been criticized by some
survivors who were sterilized without the authorization of the
Eugenics Board, it has already provided a model for other states
seeking to redress their own legacies of eugenics. North Carolina,
which was once a leading jurisdiction for sterilization, is now once
again leading the way; this time, in addressing what to do about that
shameful legacy.

514.

GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 1, 5.
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APPENDIX
A. Table 1: Percentage of Sterilized North Carolinians in Institutions,
1930–1966515

Year

Institutionalized

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

9
3
15
2
45
82
56
82
152
70
94
103
98
107
63
74
47
65
92
109
187
255
213
115
128
127
70
81

515.

NonInstitutionalized
5
4
3
2
15
85
37
42
48
59
59
73
43
41
39
42
57
69
96
135
111
112
134
168
170
165
147
224

1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 27–28.

Institutionalized
(%)
64%
43%
83%
50%
75%
49%
60%
66%
76%
54%
61%
59%
70%
72%
62%
64%
45%
49%
49%
45%
63%
69%
61%
41%
43%
43%
32%
27%
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Year

Institutionalized

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

75
45
49
34
37
36
49
26
7

NonInstitutionalized
243
215
185
214
193
204
207
141
70

1951

Institutionalized
(%)
24%
17%
21%
14%
16%
15%
19%
16%
9%
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Table 2: Percentage of Petitions Presented Without Consent of
Individual Family Member in Biennial Periods, 1934–1966516

Years
1934–1936
1936–1938
1938–1940
1940–1942
1942–1944
1944–1946
1946–1948
1948–1950
1950–1952
1952–1954
1954–1956
1956–1958
1958–1960
1960–1962
1962–1964
1964–1966

Total
Petitions
Presented
309
356
352
390
328
282
337
562
743
673
657
674
576
558
591
461

Petitions
Granted
301
350
345
385
309
276
330
543
796
650
634
658
564
531
545
368

Petitions
Without
Consent
54
20
23
12
11
10
16
21
25
30
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–

Involuntary
Petitions
(%)
17.5
5.6
6.5
3.1
3.4
3.5
4.8
3.7
3.4
4.5
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–
†
–

516. See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 1–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1936–1966)
(providing the underlying aggregate data on the petitions presented before the Eugenics
Board).
†
Number of petitions without consent were not reported after the 1952–1954 biennial
report. See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 9–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1954–1966)
(providing the underlying aggregate data on sterilizations in North Carolina during this
period).
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Table 3: Percentage of Petitions for Sterilization Authorized by
North Carolina Eugenics Board in Biennial Periods, 1934–1965517

Years
1934–1936
1936–1938
1938–1940
1940–1942
1942–1944
1944–1946
1946–1948
1948–1950
1950–1952
1952–1954
1954–1956
1956–1958
1958–1960
1960–1962
1962–1964
1964–1966

Total Petitions
Presented
309
356
352
390
328
282
337
562
743
673
657
674
576
558
591
461

Petitions
Granted
301
350
345
385
309
276
330
543
796
650
634
658
564
531
545
368

Authorized
Petitions (%)
97%
99%
98%
99%
94%
98%
98%
97%
†
107%
97%
96%
98%
98%
95%
92%
80%

517. 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT: supra note 362, at 25. The data are reported from July
of the first year through June of the concluding year. See id.
†
The 1950–1951 numbers seem to reflect petitions from an earlier period that were acted
on in the 1950–1951 period, when the Eugenics Board was aggressively pursuing its
missions. See 1952 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 395, at 8–10.
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D. Table 4: Sterilization by Gender, 1929–1966518

Year

Total

Men

Women

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

3
17
11
18
4
23
178
98
128
202
138
159
181
148
152
105
117
106
140
189
249
300
372
348
283
298
292
217

2
2
0
9
1
15
24
12
21
56
36
47
49
36
33
18
18
16
26
34
31
60
106
106
40
45
75
43

1
15
11
9
3
8
154
86
107
146
102
112
132
112
119
87
99
90
114
155
218
240
266
266
243
253
217
174

Women as
Total %
33.3%
88.2%
100%
50%
75%
34.8%
86.5%
87.8%
83.6%
72.3%
73.9%
70.4%
72.9%
75.7%
78.3%
82.9%
84.6%
84.9%
81.4%
82.0%
87.6%
80%
71.5%
76.4%
85.9%
84.9%
74.3%
80.2%

518. 1966 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 392, at 26. Data for 1944 were corrected
using 1944–1946 Biennial Report. See R. EUGENE BROWN, EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 6
BIENNIAL REPORT: JULY 1, 1944 TO JUNE 30, 1946, at 11 (1946), https://ia600201.us
.archive.org/30/items/biennialreporteug06nort/biennialreporteug06nort.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GUU6-NWTJ].
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Year
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

Total

Men

Women

305
318
260
234
248
230
240
256
167
77

52
29
22
9
8
8
7
2
3
2

253
289
238
225
240
222
233
254
164
75

1955
Women as
Total %
83.0%
90.9%
91.5%
96.2%
96.8%
96.5%
97.1%
99.2%
98.2%
97.4%
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Table 5: Sterilizations by Race in Biennial Periods, 1946–1966519

Years
1946–
1948
1948–
1950
1950–
1952
1952–
1954
1954–
1956
1956–
1958
1958–
1960
1960–
1962
1962–
1964
1964–
1966

Operations
Performed
291
468
704
626
556
562
534
467
507
356

White

Black

238

53

366

100

531

171

423

202

357

198

284

274

209

315

179

284

150

323

124

228

Native
American
0

% Black
18.2%

2

21.4%

2

24.3%

1

32.3%

1

35.6%

4

48.8%

11

59.0%

4

60.8%

14

63.7%

4

64.0%

519. See generally EUGENICS BD. OF N.C., 7–16 BIENNIAL REPORT (1946–1966)
(providing the underlying aggregate data on sterilizations by race).

